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Ding Yuan
I study the roles contracts play in the labor and corporate debt market.
Chapter 1 studies wage contracts and their roles in workers’ employment and wage
dynamics, as well as the implications on income inequality. I develop an on-the-job search
model that allows for different types of wage contracts. Using indirect inference method, I
am able to estimate the structural model and evaluate the impact of different productivity
elements, including firm productivity, returns to routine task and individual effort. The
model is able to capture key measures on worker’s labor market mobility, wage growth and
distribution. It also allows me to evaluate the implications of productivity change on income
inequality through counterfactual analysis. I show that these productivity elements have
different implications on income inequality, and the use of performance based wage contract
is an important channel for income polarization at the top percentiles.
Chapter 2 studies the effect of overtime pay on workers’ working schedule and income.
How overtime pay regulations affect the labor market is a controversial yet relatively under-
studied topic. In this paper, I study the effect of the revision to statutory overtime pay in
2004 on worker’s income and hours of work. Using monthly panel data on workers’ working
hours and income that covers the period of rule change, I find evidence that for workers who
gained statutory overtime pay coverage under the new rule, hours and income increased. I
also find spillover effects on overtime pay premium and overtime schedule for workers who are
not directly affected by the rule change. My results suggest that the standard competitive
model does not capture well the labor market for overtime work, and government regulations
could reduce labor market frictions.
Chapter 3 studies debt covenant violations and their effects on corporate innovation.
Exploiting the state of debt contract covenant violation and the institutional feature that
creditors obtain increased control right of the firm, the paper examines the effect of increased
creditor governance well before the state of bankruptcy on corporate innovation. Consistent
with the view that increased creditor monitoring has disciplining effect on the managers,
I find no significant change in the R&D spending, significant but model decrease in the
total patent counts two years forward as well as significant and large positive impact on the
citation counts of the patents. The results demonstrate that increased creditor governance
is overall beneficial to firm innovation.
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Chapter 1
Wage Contract, Employment Dynamics, and Income Inequality
1
1.1 Introduction
There has been a staggering increase in income inequality over the past three decades both
in US and the rest of the world. The rapid concentration of wealth at the top one per-
centile is empirically well-documented in Piketty and Saez (2003),Piketty and Saez (2006)
and Atkinson and Piketty (2007). Economists have put forward many explanations for the
increase in income inequality, including skill-biased technological change and the outsourcing
of manufacturing jobs. In this paper, we study the wage and employment dynamics under
performance pay and fixed wage contracts, and use a structural model to quantify the con-
tribution of difference factors to income inequality. We find that performance pay contracts
relative to fixed contracts are associated with higher income, longer working hours, faster in-
come growth, and more stable employment relationship. Using a dynamic job search model,
we were able to estimate the distribution of various productivity factors in an employment
relationship, including firm productivity, returns to routine task and individual effort, and
evaluate the impact of performance pay based employment relationship on income inequal-
ity. Our counterfactual analysis shows that change in individual performance and skill based
productivity has a much larger impact on income distribution at the top percentile than
change in productivity based on routine tasks, and the use of performance pay based wage
contracts is an important channel to translate productivity growth into income polarization
at the top percentiles.
Over the last 40 years there have been a number of structural changes in US labor
markets. Starting from the 1970s, the presence and importance of labor unions diminished
steadily. At the same time, the use of performance-based labor compensation had become
more prevalent in the labor market, so had income inequality. (Lemieux, Macleod and Par-
ent (2009)) In recent years, the burgeoning mobile information technology has brought the
so-called "gig-economy" (in which employment relationships are formed for specific "on-
2
demand" tasks without long-term commitment) to many industries.1 These issues necessi-
tates the efforts to understand the labor market through the lens of employment relationship.
Labor contract plays a very important role in shaping the relationship between workers
and their employers. How wage is determined is one of the key terms in the labor contract.
We can roughly put wage compensation into two categories: fixed wage and performance pay.
Under a fixed wage job, workers will receive pre-agreed amount of labor compensation at
specified frequency, whereas in performance pay, labor compensation will have a variable pay
component that depends on the eventual output or the quality of work, for example piece
rate, commission, bonus or tips are all different forms of performance pay. Heuristically,
employment relationship with performance pay contracts should be relatively more stable
under demand or productivity shocks: workers are incentivized to exert more effort to achieve
higher level of production, and they will share part of the risk with employers by taking a cut
in the compensation when there is a negative shock. There are quite a number of paper on
this issue. Azariadis (1975) and Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) show that fixed wage contract
is a way to provide insurance for risk-averse workers. On the other hand, Rosen (1985)
argues that if wage contracts are designed to optimally share risk with workers, then this
implies workers who are laid-off are not necessarily worse off, which seems inconsistent with
the evidence. On the empirical side, Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2009) shows that labor
compensation are more closely tied to worker attributes in performance pay jobs, and that
provides a channel for change in return to skills to translate into higher wage inequality.
Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2009) further shows that wages and working hours are more
responsive to local labor market shocks for performance pay jobs, but less responsive when it
comes to employment. Figure 1.1. shows the wage growth disparity over the past 4 decades
between jobs under different types of wage structures. While hourly-paid jobs hardly see
much real income growth across the entire income distribution during the period, salary
1For example, Uber in the transportation service industry, AirBnb in the hospitality industry, Handy in
the domestic-service industry
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Figure 1.1: Wage Growth Disparity
Data Source: Current Population Survey (CPS)
Wage is hourly wage for salary and hourly paid jobs, in 2016 dollars. In CPS survey, interviewees
are asked if they are paid by the hour. Hourly job is defined as jobs where income is hour-based.
jobs have seen a lopsided growth concentrated at the top. For salary jobs, wage growth is
much larger in scale for income at 90th percentile and above. This shows that on top of
the wealth concentration across income distributions, income inequality also has a group
dimension: certain groups have seen increased income disparity while other groups less so.
Even though the group distinction between salary and hourly jobs is not exactly cut along
the performance pay - fixed wage line, majority of the hourly paid jobs are non-performance
pay based, and performance pay jobs tend to be concentrated on the top percentiles of salary
jobs.
In this paper, we seek to better understand the impact of labor contracts on workers’
income and employment dynamics, and the contributions of different labor market factors
to labor income inequality. More specifically, we focus on the following: 1). Document the
differences in labor market mobility and wage dynamics for job spells under different wage
contracts; 2). Adapt a dynamic equilibrium job search modeling framework to incorporate
both performance pay and fixed contract to describe individual employment and income
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dynamics; 3). Estimate the structural parameters of the model to study the differences of
productivity factors under different contract group; 4). Evaluate the contribution of different
productivity factors to the cross-sectional income distribution and income growth inequality.
Using the PSID, we are able to group job spells into fixed wage or performance pay. We
mainly focus on two sets of dynamics: individual labor market mobility and wage dynamics.
For labor market mobility, we look at the transition rate of the entire worker population in
the sample (job to job transition and job to unemployment transition), conditional on their
tenure level. We also non-parametrically estimate the survival function for the two types
of transitions. For wage dynamics, we use the Mincer wage and wage growth equations to
estimate how worker’s earnings evolve over time. We performed the estimations on all the
education and wage contracts groups. Through the analysis, we have two major findings: 1).
Within the same education group, there are very big differences in labor market mobility,
workers under performance pay contracts are much less likely to switch jobs or get fired than
those under fixed wage contracts. Meanwhile, within each contract group, the gap in labor
market mobility is much less significant. 2). Returns to tenure as estimated from the Mincer
Wage Equation are higher for performance pay jobs in low and medium education groups2,
but there’s a reversal in the high education group. As the main subject of interest in our
work is the cross contract group differences, the economic significance of our empirical result
is central to our thesis. One of the pitfalls of our empirical approach is that the the choice
of wage contract might be systematically correlated with job and worker characteristics, if
that’s the case, then a cross group comparison could tell us very little about the effect of
contract itself. To mitigate this problem, we also study the subsample of individuals who had
worked under both type of wage contracts during their career, so that confounding factors
related to individual characteristics can be controlled. From the subsample, we also get the
same robust empirical result. We also show the income distribution and inequalities between
2We group individuals with education years less than 12 as low education group, between 11 to 14 as
medium education group, and above 14 as high education group.
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different contract groups along a few measures: cross-sectional distribution of income, income
growth disparity at difference income percentiles, and income inequality among workers over
long term aggregate labor income. We show that there is a relatively big income gap between
top earners in performance pay jobs both within contract group, and also compared to fixed
wage job group. Performance pay jobs also have much larger income growth rate than
fixed wage job at the top income percentile. Furthermore, prior to 1985, worker’s long
term labor income were comparatively evenly distributed, but after 1985 there starts be an
increasing income gap between top percentiles and the rest. In addition, the income gap at
top percentile between contract groups has also widened since then.
The main objective of our model is to describe the labor market process for workers
under different compensation schemes that can be easily applied to empirical analysis. Our
model combines two strands of literature in labor economics to study the dynamics of wage
and employment under different employment contract. The first strand is the literature on
wage contracts. We mainly adopt the modeling approach in Lemieux, Macleod and Parent
(2009) where they use a single period wage model to highlight the differences in performance
pay and fixed wage contracts. Wage contract differences are modeled as a function of the
worker’s effort and its effect on production. We endogenous the choice of wage contract
with monitoring cost of effort: it captures the difficulty of enforcing worker’s effort, or the
measurability of output in order for it to become contractable. The second second strand is
the structural labor. We mainly follow the modeling framework in Bagger et al. (2014), in
which they developed an equilibrium job search model to describe worker’s career dynamics
in terms of income and employment.
There are three features of the model worth highlighting: 1). We adopt the random
on-the-job-search framework in which workers have certain probably of receiving outside job
offers; 2). We add endogenous termination of employment relationship into the model, as a
result of firm’s and worker’s rational choices based on new information, we consider this to be
an important extension to many of the existing random on-the-job-search models, in which
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worker-employer separation is exogenous; 3). We include working hours into the model as an
endogenous factor, it affects both worker’s utility and production outcome, and is a result of
rational choice based on information about productivity shock. This extends the dimensions
on which the model is able to describe. In the end, our modeling framework is able to yield
a comprehensive description of worker’s labor market experience that can be easily applied
for empirical analysis.
We use indirect inference to structurally estimate the model using the long panel from
PSID on worker’s employment and labor income. The employment and earning dynamics
for workers are the key aspects of our interests, therefore we rely heavily on labor market
mobility and Mincer Wage Equations for estimation. Our model is able to produce good fit
for worker groups under both types of wage contracts, and across education groups as well.
This validates our model in terms of describing the labor market process. We view this as
central to our thesis: it shows that conventional studies using "one size fits all" modeling
for labor market data with a mixture of contractural agreements are missing important
aspects of the labor marker process, and the estimation results could be potentially biased.
This highlights the need to incorporate contractural aspects in the empirical model, which is
objective of our work. With our structural model and estimated parameters, we evaluate the
effect of different factors on the overall labor market income distribution. Our counterfactual
analysis shows that changes in different productivity elements have different implications for
income inequality, especially considering wage contracts, returns to effort have a much larger
effect on income polarization at the top end, and the use of performance pay contract is an
important channel for income polarization.
We consider our work to contribute to three strands of literature. First, we contribute
to the literature of income inequality by developing a structural model to evaluate the ef-
fects of various labor market factors, and in particular, the role of wage contract. The role
of performance pay and their contribution to income inequality has been quite extensively
documented and discussed in Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2009). As they point out, per-
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formance pay channels increase in returns to skill into income inequality. Our work extends
on that basis, and instead of looking at cross-sectional evidence, we study the dynamics of
worker’s labor market experience and how that translates into income inequality. Therefore,
it allows us to look at worker’s income difference over a more extended period of time, and
include more labor market factors. In Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2009), the difference
between contracts lies in monitoring cost and is static, by using a dynamic model, we include
more factors such as firm level productivity difference, worker’s human capital accumulation,
and worker’s change in income through switching jobs, being dismissed from worker, and
renegotiate wage contract using outside offers. By doing this, we were able to construct dif-
ferent counterfactual experiments to evaluate the contribution of different factors to income
inequality, for example, the change in productivity in effort, or lowering of monitoring cost,
individual productivity heterogeneity, and fluidity of labor market transitions. Our work
also brings a new perspective into the research on “skill biased technological change", such
as the work in Acemoglu and Autor (2010), Autor and Dorn (2013). Their paper showed
the effect of technology development, the automation of routine tasks on the polarization
of labor market. By modeling returns to different productivity factors, our approach allows
to construct counterfactual examples to evaluate the effect of growth of different type of
productivities on income inequality, for example, the increased heterogeneity in returns to
working hours (routine tasks) has a much smaller impact on income inequality than the
increased heterogeneity in returns to effort (skill based abstract tasks). Finally, our work
contributes to the study of development of income inequality over the past few decades by
studying the labor market dynamics over an extended period of time in PSID data, such as
the work in Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010), and Piketty and Saez (2003).
Our second contribution is to make extensions to the empirical study of labor con-
tracts by exploring the cross contract group differences in workers’ employment and earn-
ings dynamics. Previous work has focused on the cross-sectional and time series properties.
Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2009) is about the returns to observed and unobserved worker
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characteristics; Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2012a) studies the labor market adjustment
to demand shocks at individual level; while Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2012b) is con-
cerned on the autocovariance structure of wages and earning. In comparison, our work
makes job spell the main subject of interest, and emphasizes labor market mobility as the
key aspect of job spell. In doing so, we essentially used the methodology of structural labor
literature to study labor contracts. We find strong evidence that labor market mobility are
significantly different under the types of wage contracts: workers under performance pay
contracts tend to have more stable employment than those under fixed wage contracts, less
likely to switch job or get laid-off.3 This suggests that structural labor work in which the
models does not differentiate contractual terms might be missing an important aspect of
the model. Our structural estimation results further affirms this point: models allowing for
different types of wage compensation performs much better in replicating key features of the
data, as in comparison with singular wage contract modeling. In this way our work is trying
to bring these two strands of literature together: the empirical evidences on labor contracts
points out the need for more flexible contract modeling in structural labor work, and our
structural modeling and estimation results provide additional perspective into the impact of
wage contracts on worker’s labor market experience. Through the structural approach, we
are able to quantitatively analyze how wage flexibility affects workers’ employment stability.
Specifically, the key difference between our work and previous empirical study on labor con-
tracts is that structural model allows us, to some extent, back out the unobserved firm and
worker heterogeneity from the data, so that we can control for these factors and use coun-
terfactual analysis to quantify the impact of wage contract itself. This becomes appealing
when, on the one hand, the choice of wage contracts is related to a lot of unobserved factors
such as the the level of uncertainty faced by the firm or worker, therefore a clean reduced-
form identification is extremely hard to achieve; 4 and on the other hand, it’s very rare to
3As convention in the literature, we divide workers into three groups by their education levels, our results
are consistent across all the groups
4Ideally, identification needs randomized experiments in which workers are randomly assigned to different
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have high quality labor market data that contains both detailed firm-level and worker-level
information over extended period of time, which would be extremely helpful for researches
on labor market dynamics.
Finally, we add to the structural labor literature a framework that allows for different
contractural terms when modeling worker’s labor market experience. On the subject of
individual earnings dynamics, there is a vast amount of literature that used various stochastic
models to decompose earnings data, to name a few notable works: Abowd and Card (1989);
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004); Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005); Gottschalk and Moffitt
(2009). In recent years, there are quite a number of works that used Indirect Inference
Method to structurally estimate dynamic models on individual’s income and employment,
notably Altonji, Smith and Vidangos (2013) and Bagger et al. (2014). Our model is built
on the framework in Bagger et al. (2014), and extends it by incorporating productivity of
effort, working hours, and different wage contracts. In particular, we model the endogenous
separation process and different types of contractural commitments to wage compensation,
which, to the best of our knowledge, is new to the literature. In our model, wages and
working hours are consequences of contractural bargaining between workers and employers;
workers change jobs through on-the-job search; employment relationship terminates due to
ex-ante commitment and ex-post negative productivity shocks. Our work shows that the
modeling framework in Bagger et al. (2014)Bagger, et al (2014) can be easily extended to
study a wide range of issues in labor economics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the empirical results
on worker’s employment and wage dynamics, by their education and contract groups. In
Section 3, we present a modeling framework that describes worker’s labor market experience
over extended period of time, allowing for a number of heterogeneities and different wage
compensation scheme. In Section 4, we describes our estimation methodology and shows
wage compensation schemes and all the other labor market factor such as firm productivity, demand shocks
are kept the same for workers in different experiment groups
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Table 1.1: Worker and Job Spell Sample Count across Groups
the structural estimation results. In Section 5, we evaluate the contributions of different
productivity factors to income distribution and wage growth inequality.
1.2 Wage and Employment Dynamics
1.2.1 Data
We use the same PSID dataset as in Altonji, Smith and Vidangos (2013) and Lemieux,
Macleod and Parent (2009). Worker sample consists of those who were ever household head
during the period from 1975 to 1996. We future restrict the sample into those who were not
self-employed, have at least four consecutive periods that were in the labor force, and had
at least a job spell longer than 3 periods. In total we end up with roughly 5000 individuals,
60000 person-year and 15000 job spells.5 Following convention in the literature, we divide
workers into different groups, by their education level: high (15 to 20 years), medium (12 to
14 years) and low (7 to 11 years).
5We are very careful in following standard producers in the literature (a good example is Altonji, et al
(2013)) to process the original PSID data, as it is well-documented that variables such as "tenure" are not
well documented and needs different methodology to back out and clean. The STATA do file for the data
cleaning process is available upon request.
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Throughout the period, workers in the PSID were asked questions relevant to their
wage compensation, such as how were they being paid: in piece rate, commission, bonus,
salary, tips, or commissions, and whether they’ve received performance pay in addition to
regular salary. We adopt the same method in Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2009) to
identify performance pay jobs: job spells that are specifically recorded as performance pay
jobs or the worker had ever received compensation in the form of piece rate, bonus, tips
or commissions are identified as performance pay jobs (excluding overtime pay). Table 1.1
shows the sample count on worker and job spell across groups. The ratio of worker and
job spell under performance pay contracts ranges from about one-tenth to one-third, and
increases with education level. Middle education group has the largest sample count.
1.2.2 Labor Market Mobility
Employment duration is a very important aspect of job spells. Employment relationship
that lasts for a long period of time is considered to be stable, while jobs that are volatile
usually end with workers becoming unemployed or switching to a new job very soon. There
are different ways to look at labor market mobility. First, we consider on average how stable
is an employment relationship conditional on workers’ tenure. Figure 1.1 shows the ratio of
job spells in which the employment relationship continues for each given level of tenure. The
ratio of job continuation is consistently higher for jobs under performance pay contracts,
across all the tenure levels and education groups. Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 display the ratio
of jobs ended with workers switching to another employer or being laid off, respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Tenure effect on job continuation for different education groups and wage con-
tracts
We see a very distinctive pattern on these measures through the comparison of different
wage contracts: jobs under performance pay are much more stable than fixed wage jobs:
conditional on years of tenure, less fraction of the employment relationship end with job
switching or separation, and a larger portion of employment relationship continue to the
next period.6 It is noticeable that there tend to be a dip/bump on the graphs at the first
year tenure point. One of the reasons is that there is a significant number of cases in which
the employment relationship only lasted for a year, probably due to mismatching and the
termination of employment ensued. There is also the fact that a fraction of the tenure levels
and job spells are imputed using standard producers, hence measurement errors tend to
have a larger impact on the first few years of each job spell. This does not undermine the
significance of the results because of the consistent pattern across groups and going beyond
6During the period of our data coverage, PSID provided information annually, therefore our unite of time
period is in year.
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the first few noisy years of tenure measure.
Figure 1.2: Tenure effect on job switching for different education groups and wage contracts
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Figure 1.3: Tenure effect on job separation for different education groups and wage contracts
To take the above result a step further, we look at the employment-to-employment tran-
sition (workers switching jobs without experiencing unemployment, hereafter EE transition)
and employment-to-unemployment transition (hereafter EU transition) by nonparametri-
cally estimating their corresponding survivor function using the Kaplan Meier procedure. It
enables to deal with the problem of right-censoring commonly encountered in estimating sur-
vivor functions.7 This is also the estimates used in Bagger et al. (2014). The K-M estimates






PEE(τ) is the set of spells at risk of ending in a job-to-job transition at duration τ . DEE(τ)
is the set of spells that do end in a job-to-job transition at duration τ . The EU transition
7As a job spell terminates and registers as a realized case, it also drops out of the entire sample space.
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estimates are defined analogously.
Table 1.2 shows the estimates across education groups and wage contract types. The
results are in first-differences of the survivor function, which represent the transition propen-
sity across each period. Figure 1.4 and 1.5 plot the first-differenced estimates on EE
transition rate across contracts and across education groups, respectively. Figure 1.6 and
\ref{fig:EU_cross_edu} compares estimates on EU transition rate. These survival func-
tion estimates reassures the previous results on labor market transition ratios conditional on
tenure.
Figure 1.4: EE transition: Within Education Group Comparison
From the cross-contract comparison in Figure 1.4 and 1.6 we find that workers under
performance pay contracts are subject to less likelihood of termination of employment, either
through changing employers or becoming unemployed. The estimates on first-differenced sur-
vival rate in EE or EU transitions are often several times larger under fixed wage contract.
For example, in the middle education group (12-14 years), the first and second period differ-
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ence in EE transition survival rate are 0.1123 and 0.0511 for fixed wage and performance pay
groups; likewise for EU transition, the measures are 0.0541 and 0.0089 for these two groups,
an even more significant difference. A larger magnitude of estimate means higher likelihood
of transition across periods. From the cross-contract within-group figures we see that the
disparity in labor market mobility is bigger for EU transitions than EE transitions. EE
transition difference gap closes quickly after the first few periods whereas EU transition gap
are relatively more persistent during a job spell. We consider this to be an interesting result
as it not only shows the systematic differences in the stability of employment relationship,
but also drops hints on the underlying mechanisms that drives the differences: one plausible
explanation is that the EE transition is highly related to worker-job matching quality and
workers’ job search intensity, hence a group difference in these aspects could lead to the
survival rate gap initially, but as workers settle into their jobs the employment relationship
becomes more robust, as a result the group gap is closing; The persistent contract group dif-
ference in EU transition rates might be pointing to the constant effect of wage compensation
method on firm’s laying off decisions.
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Figure 1.5: EE transition: Cross Education Group Comparison
Figure 1.5 and 1.7 exhibit the comparison across different education groups. For EE
transition, there isn’t strong evidence for group-wise differences. For job spells under fixed
wage, the EE transition rate appears to be very similar across the three education groups; for
job spells under performance pay contracts, the EE transition rates do not have a systematic
group difference. For EU transition, in the fixed wage category, higher education group has
smaller transition rate than lower education group, suggesting that employment relationship
tend to be more stable for high-skilled worker; meanwhile the transition rates are very close
across education groups among the performance pay category.
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Figure 1.6: EU transition: Within Education Group Comparison
Throughout the statistics and plots, one result stands out: employment relationship un-
der performance pay contracts is more stable than those under fixed wage contracts in terms
of workers switching jobs or being laid off. This is central to one of our key arguments: the
flexibility of wage compensation allows firms and workers to better adjust to uncertainties,
through mechanisms such as ex-post risk-sharing and optimal production, as a result the
worker-job matching is more stable and more resilient to employment risks. As such, having
these simple comparison of estimates is not an identification strategy for the causal effects of
wage contracts. In particular, there are characteristics of jobs and workers that are system-
atically different under the two types of wage contracts. For example, performance pay jobs
tend to be more managerial (in the form of bonus payment), require higher skills and higher
education level. Confounding factors like these mean that the cross-contract differences in
labor market mobility should not be attributed to wage contract itself. However, there is
still very strong evidence on the role of wage compensation. First of all, by grouping workers
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by their education level, the effects of confounding factors such as worker skill and seniority
in the career ladder are to some extend controlled, and yet within each education group,
the differences between contracts are still significant and consistent. Moreover, the cross-
education group differences have a quite different pattern from the cross-contract differences:
EE transition differences in cross-education comparison is very little whereas significant and
diminishing with job tenure in cross-contract comparison; the magnitude of EU transition
differences in cross-contract comparison is much larger and more persistent than in cross-
education comparison. To the extend that high versus low education level and performance
pay versus fixed wage have similar group-wise differences in human capital and rank in the
organization, the fact that cross-education comparison does not match cross-contract com-
parison is strong evidence that wage contract itself plays a significant role in labor market
mobility. To affirm this point, we also look at the sub sample that consists of workers who
had ever worked under both types of wage contracts throughout their careers. For the sub
sample, we end up with 1252 workers, 1512 job spells under performance pay contracts and
3117 job spells under fixed wage contracts. Figure 1.8 shows the comparison for both EE
and EU transition. The difference between contract groups are essentially the same as in the
full sample: workers under performance pay contracts have less propensity to switch jobs,
but the difference closes up in a few years; workers under fixed wage contracts are more
likely to become unemployed and the gap between contract groups is consistent throughout
the job spell. This sub-sample enables us to control for unobserved worker characteristics
that are systematically related to wage compensation methods since the workers in the two
wage contract groups are exactly the same. All in all, we conclude that there is significant
differences in labor market mobility across wage contract groups, and also there’s strong
evidence that wage compensation method might play a role in it.
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Figure 1.7: EU transition: Cross Education Group Comparison
Figure 1.8: EE and EU transition: Sub-Sample Comparison
1.2.3 Working Hours and Wage Dispersion
In addition to labor market mobility, we are also very interested in workers’ wages and hours
of work. Fixed wage contracts are less flexible in compensations than performance pay
contracts. Therefore, the within job spell variations in wages and hours would reflect that
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on the intensive margin. Under a negative shock, a firm could choose to layoff the worker if
her wages and hours are rigid. Alternatively, the firm could choose to pay less and demand
less working hours if the wage contract allows for ex-post adjustment.
Figure 1.9: Within job spell average annual working hours distribution
Consequently, we should expect to see that within a job spell, wages and working hours
tend to have larger variations for performance pay jobs. Table 1.5 reports the summary
statistics on the wages and hours of work in the data. On average, performance pay jobs
have longer working hours and higher wages. The group averages on annual working hours
(fixed wage jobs versus performance pay jobs) are 2018 v.s. 2292, 2104 v.s. 2246, 2013 v.s.
2302 for low, medium and high education groups, respectively. The comparisons for wages
are similar.
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Figure 1.10: Within job spell average log wage distribution
Performance pay jobs also tend to have larger variations in wages and working hours.
For each job spell, we measure the variations (in standard deviation) of wages and working
hours, then we look at how the statistics are distributed across the entire population in the
data. The average level of wage (in logs) variation within each job spell is considerably larger
in performance pay jobs. Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 plot the density graphs for within job
spell average level of annual working hours and wages. Figure 1.11 and Figure 1.12 plot the
density graphs for within job spell variations of hours and wages. The differences between
the two wage contract groups are evident from these figures. Workers with performance pay
jobs tend to work longer hours and receive higher compensations. At the same time, their
hours and wages are more volatile.
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Figure 1.11: Within job spell variation of annual working hours: distribution
Figure 1.12: Within job spell variation of log wage: distribution
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1.2.4 Mincer Wage Equations












it + ψi + εit
Where i is job match, wit is log wage for job match i in period t. tit and sit are tenure and
potential experience respectively, ψi is job match fixed effect. In the regression specification,
we use polynomials up to third order to model returns to tenure and potential experience.
Table 1.3 reports the estimates across groups. Comparing the estimated numbers within
each education group, the wage dynamics are quite different for different contract groups.
For example, the linear term coefficient for returns to tenure ξ11 are 0.09955 v.s. 0.1820 for
fixed wage workers v.s. performance pay workers in low education group. The estimates
comparisons for medium and high education group are 0.0744 v.s. 0.1346 and 0.0652 v.s.
0.0434 respectively. Meanwhile, within the same wage contract group, the wage returns are
relatively stable across education groups, especially for fixed wage contracts, the fact that we
have more samples in that group than for performance pay jobs might have contributed to
that. Figure 1.1 plots the wage-tenure profile for each education group. The return profiles
are quite different between contract groups but is not consistent across education levels:
returns to tenure for fixed wage jobs are lower in lower and medium education groups, but
the relationship is reversed in high education group.
1.2.5 Wage Contracts and Income Inequality
The previous sections show the differences of the wage and employment dynamics under
different wage contracts. In this section, we show the income distributions and inequalities.
Differences in labor market mobilities for workers translate into income inequalities mainly
through two channels. First, a more robust employment relationship implies a more steady
income stream for the worker. Employees who voluntarily leave their jobs or are dismissed
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by the employers usually suffer a huge income loss for a prolonged period of time. Second,
switching between jobs is a common way for workers to get higher salaries, due to better
productivity matching or negotiations for better contract terms. Therefore, workers with
more stable employment relationships and more outside job options tend to earn more. The
dispersions and fluctuations of working hours are also related to the cross-sectional differ-
ences in worker’s labor income, since it translates into productivities and workers usually get
compensated more for longer working hours. The differences in the growth of wage over a
worker’s tenure will also translate into income inequality, since the accumulation of working
experience and job tenure does not translate into income increase at the same rate.
We illustrate the contract group differences in income distributions by three measures.
First, we measure the cross-sectional distributions of income by education and wage contract
groups. Second, we measure the cross-sectional differences in income growth at different in-
come levels. Finally, we look at the distributions of aggregate income over a long period of
time for workers under different wage contracts.
Figure 1.3 shows the income distributions by education and wage contract groups. We
measure the average annual labor income of each job spell in the panel data, and plot
the cross-sectional distributions of the average job spell income at each percentile. The
first graph plots the comparison between wage contract groups. Under performance pay
contracts, there is a large gap of income between those above the 90th percentile and the
rest, as shown by the sudden steep increase in the slop of the income distribution line. In
comparison, jobs under fixed wage contracts are distributed more evenly on income, as the
distribution graph is relatively flat in the top percentile range. The remaining three graphs
plot the distributions by education groups. As illustrated, the income gap between the top
earners and the rest under performance pay jobs is larger for low and medium education
groups, whereas the income distributions of high education groups are relatively flat both
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within and cross the two contract groups.
Figure 1.4 shows the wage growth rates at different income percentiles. We measure
the income growth rate within each job spell as the median of the rolling 2-year annual
labor income growth rates. We plot the average wage growth rate of each job spell at their
corresponding income percentile, as well as a fitting line that represents the distribution.
The first graph shows the overall contract group differences: wage growth rates at the two
contract groups are relatively similar below the 80th percentile of income distribution, but
there is a large difference at the top percentile: high income earners (above the 80th income
percentile) with performance pay jobs have much larger income growth rates than the fixed
wage jobs at similar income percentiles. This shows that not only do upper income percentile
jobs under performance pay have disproportionally high incomes than the rest, they also have
much larger income growth rates, further increasing the cross-sectional income inequality.
The remaining three graphs plot the distributions by education group. Similar to Figure
1.3, the income growth rate gap between top earners under performance pay and the rest
is larger for low and medium education groups, whereas the income distributions of high
education groups are relatively flat both within and cross contract groups.
Figure 1.5 plots the long term labor income distributions by different contract groups.
On top of annual labor income distributions and the corresponding differences in income
growth, we are also interested in the labor income inequality over an extended period of time.
To that end, we look at workers’ aggregate labor incomes over a five-year time horizon. We
include three difference cases. 1). Starting with the initial period, the total labor income
of each worker over the next five years, regardless if she becomes unemployed or switched
jobs over the period; 2). Starting with the initial period, the total labor income of each
worker over the next five years, not including cases where the worker becomes unemployed,
but allowing for switching to new jobs; 3). Starting with the initial period, the total labor
income of each worker over the next five years, only including cases where the worker is
continuously employed by the same employer. On the left side of the figure, we only plot
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cases where the initial period is before 1985; on the right side of the figure, we include all
the cases. A comparison between the three graphs on the left and the three on the right
shows the trend in income distribution: prior to 1985, workers’ long term labor incomes were
relatively evenly distributed, but after 1985, there was an increasing income gap between
the top percentiles and the rest. In addition, the income gap at the top percentiles between
the two contract groups has also widened since. The comparison between the graphs on the
left also shows the impact of labor market mobility on contract group income gap at the
top percentiles: the income gap at the top percentiles between performance pay and fixed
wage jobs is larger when we include workers’ transitions into new jobs in comparison to the
5-year continuous employment group. This shows that job transitions play an important
role in increasing the income gap between contract groups at the top percentile. Workers on
high-income performance pay jobs gain even higher long-term labor income by transitioning
into new jobs, compared with high income fixed wage jobs. Likewise, comparing the top
chart with the middle chart shows that employment stability also plays an important role
in the income gap at the top percentiles. As shown in the labor market mobility estimates,
performance pay jobs are more stable in terms of involuntary separation, this means workers
under performance pay jobs are more likely to maintain a stable income stream over a long
period of time.
1.3 Model
Our model combines two strands of literature in labor economics to study the dynamics of
wage and employment under different wage contracts. The first strand of literature is on wage
contract. We mainly adapt the modeling approach in Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2009),
where a single period wage model is used to highlight the differences between performance
pay and fixed wage contracts. The second strand of literature is on structural labor search
models. We follow the modeling framework in Bagger et al. (2014), in which they developed
an on-the-job search model to describe worker’s career dynamics in terms of income and
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employment.
By combining these two approaches, we are able to model the dynamics under different
wage contracts in a unified framework. The difference between wage contracts is modeled
on worker’s effort and its effect on production, since performance pay jobs tend to be more
skill-driven, and the outcomes are more dependent on the efforts from the employees. We
endogenize the choice of wage contracts to account for the intrinsic differences between
the two groups of jobs. The key factor in the endogenous choice of wage contracts is the
monitoring cost of effort: it captures the difficulties of monitoring and enforcing worker’s
effort, as well as the measurability of output in order for it to become contractable.
We model the production as a composition of different elements and highlight a key
pair: the productivity of routine tasks and the productivity of individual efforts. Routine
task is proxied by hours of work, and individual effort depends on the worker’s unobserved
ability and preference for leisure. Since the use of performance pay is considered to induce
a more efficient level of individual efforts, we are interested in studying the implications of
growth in different productivities on labor market income distributions.
We add these modeling features to the framework in Bagger et al. (2014). Under this
framework, the employment and wage dynamics of each worker are results of on-the-job
search for outside options and wage bargaining. The model generates trackable solutions on
wage and employment, which can be adapted for model estimation using Indirect Inference.
As a result, the combined approach allows us to model the dynamic process under different
wage contracts, and study the implications of different production factors on the differences
between wage contract groups.
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1.3.1 Model setup and timeline
1.3.1.1 Period Production
Firm’s production in period t is modeled as follows (in log terms):
yijt = pj + θi + g(t) + γjteit + φjthijt + εijt
pj is the firm-specific productivity for firm j, θi is the worker-specific productivity. g(t) is the
productivity growth due to accumulated working experience and is assumed to be the same
for all workers8. The term γjteit is the productivity associated with worker’s effort eit, and
γjt is the return to worker’s individual effort due to firm j’s production technology. Finally,
φjthijt is the productivity through hours of work: φjt is productivity of working hours that
fluctuates over time, and hijt is the hours of work in each period. εijt is a period by period
random productivity shock.
Workers’ utility is modeled on their preference for consumption, leisure, and the cost of
effort. We assume there is no technology for saving, and the workers consume all of their
labor income in each period. Hours of work and exerting effort cause disutility for workers.
Formally, worker’s period utility is given by:
U = Cit − hωijt − exp(eit − αi)
hω is the disutility from working (by the hour), and exp(eit − αit) is the disutility from
exerting efforts. eit is the level of effort and αi is the worker’s ability. A higher level of αi
means it is easier for the worker to exert (the same level of) effort.
8Following the literature, we model the productivity growth as a polynomial function of experience:




1.3.2 Choice of Contract: Performance Pay and Fixed Wage
We model the choice of wage contracts following the approach used in Lemieux, Macleod
and Parent (2009). It is built on the insight from Lazear (1986) that when a worker’s ability
is not perfectly observed, there could be a mismatch between the worker and the task, and
performance pay can be used to reduce the mismatch and increase productivity. Formally, we
model a worker’s ability αi as private information to herself, firms could not observe nor verify
it. We assume αi follows distribution αi ∼ N(αˆi, σ2i ). The distribution is common knowledge
to both the worker and the firm. αˆi σ2i are based on worker’s observable characteristics, such
as education level, age, and marital status. In a fixed wage contract, workers agree to supply
a fixed level of effort e¯it; in a performance pay contract, workers would choose the optimal
level of effort based on their true ability e∗it(αi). In order to implement performance pay,
there is a monitoring cost per period for the firm, denoted as Mj. It is assumed to be firm-
specific and time invariant. The monitoring cost for performance pay is based on the idea
that contractibility of output and monitoring cost of effort affect the choice of contract form
in employment relationships. In many situations, the output is hard to measure objectively,
and hence it is difficult to contract on them - it’s hard to compensate workers based on their
work when both parties could not agree on the outcome. When a worker’s effort needs to be
constantly monitored to prevent shirking at work, and when the monitoring cost is high, the
benefit of added productivity may be outweighed by the monitoring cost itself. We assume
that firms choose the type of wage contracts and make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to worker
i. The wage contract is chosen based on known information to the firm so as to maximize
firm’s expected profit.
Formally, we model the optimal efforts and choice of labor contracts as follows. Each
period, the firm chooses the optimal expected aggregate output (production outcome minus
worker’s period disutility from working hours hit and level of effort eit, and monitoring cost
Mj, since a worker’s utility in labor compensation cit is linear) because employment contracts
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are determined through Nash Bargaining, which seek to maximize the total utility of both
parties.
Under fixed wage jobs, contracting on effort will be based on the expectation of the worker’s
ability. The expected aggregate utility related to effort is given by:
AUijt(eit)FW = γjteit − E{exp(eit − αi)} = γjteit − exp{eit − αˆi + σ2i }
The optimal choice of effort level e¯∗it stipulated in a fixed wage contract is given by e¯∗it, and
is invariant to the worker’s actual ability αi:
e¯∗it = argmaxeitAUijt(eit)FW = log γjt + αˆi − σ2i
Under performance pay jobs, workers choose optimal level of effort based on their ability αi.
The aggregate output is given by:
AUijt(eit)PPJ = γjteit − exp(eit − αi)−Mj
The optimal level of effort chosen by a worker with ability αi is given by:
e∗it(αi) = argmaxeitAUijt(eit)PPJ = log γjt + αi
The optimal choice of contract is determined by the aggregate output in the effort-related por-
tion. Under fixed wage contract, the expected output is given by AU∗ijt(eit)FW = γjt[logγjt +
αˆi − σ2i − 1], under performance pay contract, the ex-ante expected output is given by
AU∗ijt(eit)PPJ = γjt[log γjt + αˆi − 1] −Mj. The choice between performance pay and fixed
wage contract is then determined by AU∗ijt(eit)FW and AU∗ijt(eit)PPJ . Performance pay con-
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tracts will be chosen if and only if:
AU∗ijt(eit)PPJ > AU
∗





For the level of effort e¯∗it in a fixed wage contract, it can be thought of as workers being
expected to exert proper efforts at work place and maintain the basic professional standards,
such as always be on time for duties or not dozing off at work. These behaviors can be
easily observed in workplaces without incurring much costs. For the level of effort e∗it(αi)
under performance pay contracts, either workers’ output can be objectively measured (for
example, investment bankers making profits on specific deals), or monitored though methods
such as internal auditing or annual performance review. In this context, monitoring cost Mj
is an abstract term that represents either operational cost for monitoring, or feasibility of
measuring performance-based output γjteit.
We use monitoring costs to model the choice of wage contracts for a few reasons. First,
previous research shows evidence that the use of performance pay is related to the feasibility
of objective evaluation of output or workers’ efforts. For example, MacLeod and Parent
(1998) shows that when the evaluation of performance are more subjective, firms tend to
base compensations on easy measures such as the number of hours worked. Second, even
though in reality the choice between performance pay and fixed wage is affected by many
other factors, from a modeling perspective such a setup is sufficient to distinguish the key
differences between the two contract groups. Workers with higher ability tend to have
performance based contracts, such as white collar jobs. It is captured by the distribution of
workers’ ability. As equation (1.3.1) shows, the higher the noise in the worker’s ability αi
is, the more likely a performance pay contract is used. And the optimal effort choices under
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the two contracts (e∗it(αi) and e¯∗it) show that workers under performance pay are more likely
to exert higher levels of effort at work.
1.3.2.1 On-the-job Search Dynamics
We follow Bagger et al. (2014) in modeling the job search process. Workers are randomly
matched with firms whose productivities of different dimensions are drawn from an under-
lying distribution. The wage contract is set through bargaining between the firm and the
worker. When a employment contract is signed, all the production uncertainties are un-
known, but the distributions of the uncertainties are common knowledge to both parties.
When a worker is unemployed and actively looking for jobs, she has probability λ0 each
period of being matched with a firm. When a worker is employed, there is a probability of
µ that she permanently leaves the work force, exogenous probability that the employment
relationship dissolves (but the worker remains in the work force). Endogenous employment
termination happens when there is a random negative productivity shock large enough that
makes the value of the contract lower than either party’s outside option (unemployment
and no production). The probability is denoted as τ . Consistent with the original model
in Bagger et al. (2014), we allow for the probability that a newly unemployed worker finds
a new job immediately, denoted as κ. When the worker is on the job, at the end of each
period, there is probability λ1 that the worker is matched with an outside firm.
An outside offer from another firm is the main channel through which workers renego-
tiate wage contracts or switch jobs. Figure 1.1 from Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010) shows
the evolution of a wage contract: when the worker receives an outside offer higher than the
current employment contract from a less productive firm, she will use this to renegotiate her
wage contract and get a larger surplus, since the outside offer becomes her new reservation
value. When the outside offer is lower than the current contract value, the worker will hide
it from her current employer since it does not help her negotiate up her wage. When the
outside firm is more productive than the current employer, the worker will switch to the new
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job, and use the offer at the previous firm to negotiate a new wage contract.
Figure 1.1: Wage negotiation process between firm and workers
*Source: Postel-Vinay, Fabien, and Helene Turon (2010) “On-The-Job Search,
Productivity Shocks, And The Individual Earnings Process". International Economic
Review
1.3.3 Wage contract and equilibrium model
We use the framework in Bagger et al. (2014) to model a worker’s employment and wage
dynamics with a few modifications. Their model allows for elegant closed form solutions
for a dynamic employment contract, and also has steady state equilibrium solutions for the
labor market.
1.3.3.1 Productivity Composition
To use the modeling framework in Bagger et al. (2014), we need to categorize the different
productivity elements and transform them into the elements used in their original paper.
Their modeling approach includes steady and dynamic productivity elements as well as
production uncertainties from different sources. It allows for closed-form solutions of wage
contracts and intuitive analysis on the workers’ wage and employment dynamics.
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The production can be broken down into three elements: 1). Deterministic steady
productivities that are known to both parties when the contract is signed, such as firm’s
productivity pj; 2). Deterministic productivities that grow over time, such as the worker’s
productivity growth over experience g(t); 3). Zero-mean productivity uncertainties that vary
over time.
Firm’s productivity pj and worker’s productivity θi are in the first category. We also
put the expected productivity from effort, given the endogenous choice of wage contract,
into the first category. We assume that the returns to effort γjt are considered to be stable
when signing the contract. This is for modeling convenience so that it allows for closed form
solutions to the equilibrium model. It is also used to ensure that workers do not change
contracts within each job spell, absent an outside offer. To account for the increase in the
return to effort due to technological changes, we allow workers to renegotiate contracts based
on their most updated level of returns to effort γit when they receive outside offers. In this
way, effort of production will increase over time within each job spell, and the worker will also
be able to negotiate up her wage. Depending on the choice of wage contracts, the return to
effort is either AUijt(e∗it(αi))PPJ = γjt[log γjt+αi]−Mj or AUijt(e¯it)FW = γjt[logγjt+αˆi−σ2i ].
The deterministic growth trend in a worker’s productivity is g(t) and it belongs to the second
category. The productivity associated with working hours can be divided into two parts: the
expected value and a zero-mean random component. The optimal choice of working hours
in the contract is given by maximizing the total hours output minus worker’s disutility of
working:




















)ω/(ω−1)−Φ(φjt), then the hours productivity can be broken down into φjth∗ijt = Φ(φjt)+
ξ(φjt). Φ(φjt) belongs to the first category as a deterministic steady productivity, and ξ(φjt)
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belongs to the second category as a zero-mean productivity uncertainty.
To summarize: the deterministic steady productivity includes firm’s and worker’s pro-
ductivity pj and θi, productivity from worker’s effort AUijt, and average productivity from
hours of work Φ(φjt); the deterministic productivity growth comes from worker’s human cap-
ital accumulation and skill development g(t); the zero-mean productivity uncertainty consists
of period-by-period productivity shock εijt and the residuals from hours productivity ξ(φjt)
1.3.3.2 Employment Contract
In our model, an employment contract is defined by three terms: (r, ht, et). r is the proportion
of net productivity (firm’s production minus worker’s disutility from working hours and
effort) that the worker has claim to. ht is the number of hours the worker agrees to work
at each period, it varies depending on the productivity shock on working hours each period.
et is the level of effort the worker agrees to supply, it depends on the form of the chosen
wage contract: in a fixed wage contract, worker’s effort is chosen at a fixed level e¯∗it; in a
performance pay contract, worker will choose the efficient effort level e∗it(αi) based on returns
to effort γit and her own ability αi.
A worker’s labor income consists of two parts: the first part is the direct monetary
compensation for her disutility9 from hours of work and efforts; the second part is the
proportional claim to the aggregate output net of monitoring cost if any, as is captured by
r in the labor contract. Since output is in log terms, the proportional claim is additive.
Formally, the second part wage is:
Wijt =

r + yPPJijt −Mj + exp(e∗it − αi) + h∗ωijt for performance pay
r + yFWijt + γjt + h
∗ω
ijt for fixed wage
The reason for such a two part wage schedule is that, in Nash Bargaining, both parties
will divide based on the joint surplus that are maximized to the best of their ability. A
9expected disutility in the case of fixed wage contract
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worker’s outside option is her reservation wage. In that case, she can enjoy total leisure
without exerting any effort. Firm’s outside option is shutting down the production. As a
result, compensating for worker’s working disutility before dividing the surplus is a natural
outcome. In essence, a worker’s disutility is translated into production cost for the firm in
the model. In our model, a worker’s compensation varies from period to period under a
fixed wage contract. This is consistent with the empirical fact, partly because factors such
as overtime work affect a worker’s total labor income, and our model specifically accounts
for that. The key difference between the two wage contracts in our model is consistent with
Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2009), it is the incentive and compensation structure for
worker’s effort that distinguish the two types of contracts.
Before modeling the wage contract, we first define a few transformed elements of pro-
duction based on the three productivity categories defined above. The purpose is to simplify
the analytical structure and to be consistent with the modeling framework in Bagger et al.
(2014).
We define p˜ ∼ F (p, θ,M, α, γ, φ) as the fixed components of production in a worker-firm
match. The distribution of p˜ is determined by the productivity components (p, θ,M, α, γ, φ).
The total value of an employment contract to the worker at period t is given by V (r, gt, p˜),
where gt = g(t) and p˜ jointly determine the total surplus of an employment relationship going
forward. Since r is the worker’s proportional claim to total surplus10, V (0, gt, p˜) represents
the total value of an employment match. When a worker is approached by an outside firm
with production characteristic p˜′, the outcome will depend on how it compares to the worker’s
current employer (p˜). There are three scenarios:
Case 1: p˜′ > p˜
In this case, the worker is approached by a firm with a higher level productivity. The outside
firm will be able to poach the worker because they can afford to offer a higher wage than the
10er is the nominal proportion, since production and wage is in log terms in the model
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current firm does. The current employment match value becomes the worker’s new outside
option, and the wage negotiation with the outside firm will be based on it, because the
worker can use the outside firm offer to extract all the surplus from her current employer.
Formally, the wage bargaining with the outside firm is as follows:
EtV (r
′, gt+1, p˜′) = Et{V (0, gt+1, p˜) + β[V (0, gt+1, p˜′)− V (0, gt+1, p˜)]}
β ∈ [0, 1] is the bargaining power of the worker, V (0, gt+1, p˜) is the total surplus from current
employment, as the worker’s outside option. r′ is the new wage rate with the outside firm
through bargaining. The expectation term Et is taken over zero-mean production uncertain-
ties [εijt, ξ(φjt)], as defined in the previous section.
When the outside firm’s productivity is lower than that of the current employer (p˜′ < p˜),
there are two possibilities. When the total surplus of matching with the outside firm is
reasonably high, the worker will be able to use this outside option to negotiate up her wage
with the current employer. On the other hand, when the total surplus is sufficiently low,
she will stay on the same job and will not be able to renegotiate for a higher wage. Let the
cutoff point be q˜:
Case 2: q˜ < p˜′ < p˜
The worker will be able to renegotiate a more favorable wage contract with the current
employer. The wage renegotiation will raise the wage to r′:
EtV (r
′, gt+1, p˜) = Et{V (0, gt+1, p˜′) + β[V (0, gt+1, p˜)− V (0, gt+1, p˜′)]}
Case 3: p˜′ < q˜ < p˜
The worker’s wage will remain the same.
The cutoff value q˜ is when the wage contract from renegotiation is exactly the same as the
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old contract:
EtV (r, gt+1, p˜) = Et{V (0, gt+1, q˜) + β[V (0, gt+1, p˜)− V (0, gt+1, q˜)]}
The worker’s reservation value from unemployment benefit is V0(gt). The wage when the
worker is first employed is given by EtV (r0, gt+1, p˜) = V0(gt) + βEt{V (0, gt+1, p˜)− V0(gt)}.
The above discussion lays out a worker’s employment transition process from one job to
another. For unemployment, there is the possibility of endogenous and exogenous separation.
For exogenous separation, each period there is probability of µ that the worker leaves the
employment pool permanently, and probability δ that an employment relationship dissolves.
These probabilities correspond to random shocks to employment, such as an accident to the
worker or the firm’s sudden bankruptcy. For endogenous separation, when a period shock
[εijt, ξ(φjt)] makes the current employment value lower than the worker’s reservation wage,
the employment relationship will be terminated. Formally, the condition for endogenous
separation is:




ijt − h∗ωijt + εijt + βEt+1V (r, gt+1, p˜)
We add the possibility of endogenous separation to the original modeling framework because
it adds an additional dimension of differences between performance pay contracts and fixed
wage contracts: as performance pay contracts tend to be more efficient, the corresponding
employment relationship is relatively more stable since the added productivity could help to
offset random negative shocks.
The model allows closed form solutions for the wage process and therefore is very useful
when it comes to simulation for workers’ income and employment dynamics. For details on
the model solution derivation, we refer the readers to Bagger et al. (2014). In the following,
we lay out some key elements of the model solutions.
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The wage that a worker receives (compensation for disutility and proportional claim to




(1− β) ρ+ δ + µ+ λ1F¯ (x)
ρ+ δ + µ+ λ1βF¯ (x)




ijt + εijt (1.3.2)
where F (p˜) is the transformed distribution of p˜ ∼ (p, θ,M, α, γ, φ) and F¯ (x) = 1−F (x).
One of the key factors in solving the wage equation is the cutoff point q˜ for wage renegotiation.
It depends on the current wage rate r and the employment match productivity p˜, gt. Given
the current productivity and cutoff value (p˜ijt, q˜ijt), the cross-period evolvement of the pair
for each worker depends on the probability of an outside offer and random employment
shocks. Specifically, the distribution of (p˜ijt+1, q˜ijt+1) conditional on (p˜ijt, q˜ijt) is given by:
(p˜ijt+1, q˜ijt+1) =

(p˜ijt, q˜ijt) with probability 1− τ − µ− δ − λ1F¯ (q˜it)
(p˜ijt, q˜) with density λ1f(q˜)
(p˜, p˜ijt) with density λ1f(p˜)
(p˜, p˜min) with density (δ + τ)κf(p˜)
(0, 0) with probability µ+ τ + (δ + τ)(1− κ)
where τ is the probability of endogenous separation. The first case refers to the situation
where the worker remains on the same job under the same contract. This happens when the
worker does not experience unemployment shock, and even when receiving an outside option
with probability λ1, the offer is not good enough to allow renegotiation of wage. The second
case refers to when the worker receives an outside offer that is high enough to negotiate a
new wage contract but not high enough to switch job. The third case refers to when the
worker gets an outside offer high enough that she switches job. The fourth case refers to
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when the worker becomes unemployed and immediately gets a new job offer. The last case
refers to when the worker becomes unemployment in the next period.
1.3.3.3 Labor Market Equilibrium
Following the literature on on-the-job search labor models, we define the labor market equi-
librium as a steady state in which the unemployment rate and the density of employment
match at each productivity-labor contract pair (p˜ijt, q˜ijt) to be stable. This implies that the
in-and-out flow of the unemployment pool, and the density of workers at each productivity
pair (p˜ijt, q˜ijt) should be the same.
For unemployment rate u, let the proportion of employed workers with experience level
t be a1(t), then the unemployment steady pool is given by the following two conditions:
(λ0 + µ)u(1− a1(t)) = (δ + τ)(1− κ)(1− u)a1(t)
(1− u)a1(t) = [1− µ− τ − (δ + τ)(1− κ)](1− u)a1(t− 1) + λ0u(1− a1(t− 1))
The first equation states that, at each period, the number of previously unemployed
workers getting a job should be equal to the number of unemployed workers who lost their
jobs. The second equation states that the pool of employed workers with experience t consists
of workers from previous period t− 1 who remain employed into the next period, and those
who had just become newly hired. Together, these two conditions pin down the equilibrium
condition for any given level of worker experience.
For the equilibrium conditions of employment at any given level of productivity p˜, con-
sider the distribution of employment density L(p˜). The exit rate of workers from employment
productivity less than p˜ is µ+(δ+τ)(1−κ)+((δ+τ)κ+λ1)F¯ (p˜). The first half is due to unem-
ployment, the second half is due to job switch when the worker transits to a more profitable
firm. The inflow of workers into the pool is given by λ0uF (p˜)+(δ+τ)κ[1−L(p)](1−u)F (p˜).
The first half represents workers who become newly employed, the second half represents
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workers who are reallocated into the pool because they are poached by outside offers. The
equilibrium condition is then given by:
µ+ (δ + τ)(1− κ) + ((δ + τ)κ+ λ1)F¯ (p˜) = λ0uF (p˜) + (δ + τ)κ[1− L(p)](1− u)F (p˜)
For a thorough discussion of the solutions to the steady state equilibrium, we refer the readers
to Bagger et al. (2014).
1.3.4 Discussions on the model
In this section, we discuss the key features of the model, and the mechanisms through which
it captures the labor market income and employment dynamics.
1.3.4.1 Wage Contracts
Wage contract is modeled on uncertainties about worker’s ability. As discussed in the pre-
vious section, this follows the insight from Lazear (1986) and the modeling approach in
Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2009). The trade off in the choice of contracts is between an
inefficient level of effort under fixed wage contracts and an added monitoring cost to enforce
effort under performance pay contracts. The choice of wage contracts comes down to three
elements: the level of uncertainty on the worker’s ability σ2i , the productivity of effort γjt,
and the monitoring cost of effort Mj. We assume that the level of uncertainty σ2i is invariant
across time, this means that throughout the entire career of a worker, the variation of wage
contracts at different jobs depends only on firm level characteristics - productivity of effort
and monitoring cost. The use of performance pay contracts depends on the uncertainty:
workers with a higher level of σ2i are more likely to choose performance pay contracts. In
doing so, we allow for the heterogeneity in wage contracts along multiple dimensions through
calibration of parameters at both the worker and firm levels.
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1.3.4.2 Job Search and Labor Market Transitions
In our on-the-job search framework, outside job offers arrive randomly in each period. Unlike
directed-search models, there is no intrinsic mechanism for the matching and sorting between
high productivity firms and workers. Labor market transition for workers is a result of the
the search process. Even though the search probabilities are the same for all workers, the
model generates differences in transition probabilities through productivities: for job to
job transition, workers in a more productive firm are less likely to switch to another job
because outside job offers are less likely to beat the current one, since the outside firms’
productivities are drawn from the same distribution. For endogenous separation, workers
under performance pay contract choose more efficient levels of effort, as a result, they are
less likely to terminate the employment relationship under negative productivity shocks.
1.3.4.3 Wage Growth
There are three sources of wage growth in our model. The first one is the increase in
worker’s productivity through experience g(t) - workers accumulate skills and become more
productive on their jobs. The second source is job search - workers use outside offers as
leverage to renegotiate higher wage with their current employers, or switch to better-paying
jobs. The third source of wage growth is productivity growth over time, including firm-
level and worker-level productivity increases, as well as increases in returns to routine tasks
(hours of work) and returns to effort. In our model, we assume that these productivities are
considered to be static during the contract negotiation process, and productivity growth is
modeled as unexpected mean-increasing shock in the underlying distribution.
1.3.5 Model Simulation
Key parameters of the model are simulated based on their corresponding distributions. Firm
level productivity pj follows the Weibull distribution: Fp(pj) = 1− exp(−[ν1(pj − pmin)]ν2).
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Worker’s productivity follows (truncated) normal distribution: θi ∼ |N(θ¯, σ2θ)|. Similarly,
γj and θj follow truncated normal distributions: γj ∼ |N(γ¯, σ2γ)| and φj ∼ |N(φ¯, σ2φ)|. The
distributions of γj and φj allow for cross-firm heterogeneities in productivity. To model
the within-firm growth in returns to effort and the fluctuation in working hours, we use an
additive structure: γjt = γjt−1 + ε(γ)jt, γj0 = γj. The random disturbance ε(γ)jt is strictly
positive to make sure γ is increasing over time: ε(γ)jt ∼ |N(0, σ2ε(γ))|. We model worker’s
ability αi based on the average level αˆi and uncertainty σ2i . The cross sectional distribution
of αˆi is drawn from the distribution N(α¯, σ2α), and the level of uncertainty is linear in worker’s
average ability: σ2i = κααˆi. The firm level hour productivity is given by φjt = φj+φ¯t+ε(φ)jt.
The random shock ε(φ)jt follows a zero-mean normal process: ε(φ)jt ∼ N(0, σ2ε(φ)), and φ¯t
is a fixed growth rate for hour productivity. The random shock εit is assumed to follow
an AR(1) process: εit = ηεit−1 + uit where uit is a mean-zero random shock. Worker’s
productivity growth g(t) is modeled to be three-order polynomials g(t) = ψ1t+ ψ2t2 + ψ3t3.
Monitoring cost is drawn from a uniform distribution: Mj ∼ U(Mmin,Mmax)
The key part of transforming the original model in Bagger et al. (2014) into a canonical
model that incorporates both wage contracts is transforming the added productivity elements
into the three categories as described above. p˜j = pj + AU∗ijt + Φ(φjt), the transformed p˜
includes the firm productivity pj, monitoring cost Mj, returns to effort γjt. The distribution
of p˜ is an empirical distribution from the joint distribution of all the composite elements.
In simulation, we construct the distribution of p˜ by simulating its composite elements and
add them up. The transformed random productivity shock ε˜ijt = εijt + ξ(φjt) is constructed
similarly.
We first simulate worker’s employment status based on the job search process (δ, τ, µ, λ0, λ1, κ).
Then productivity elements (pj, θi, g(t), γjt, eit, φjt, hijt, εijt) are determined through random
draws from the underlying distributions of the structural parameters. Worker’s income each
period is determined by Equation 1.3.2. Through such a simulation process, we are able to




We use indirect inference to estimate our structural model. We estimate the model by ed-
ucation groups. There are 3 education groups based on year of schooling: 7-11, 12-14, and
15-20. Each education group has two wage contract subgroups: fixed wage and performance
pay.
The theoretical foundations and statistical properties of indirect inference have been exten-
sively discussed in the literature, for example, Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) and
Bruins et al. (2015). Indirect inference has been applied to many fields of empirical research
and in particular, structural models. Quite a number of paper on structural labor applied
this estimation method, including Bagger et al. (2014) and Altonji, Smith and Vidangos
(2013). The basic idea is to select a few reduced form econometric models called “Auxil-
iary Models" that are of empirical interests, estimate these econometric models from the real
dataset, and subsequently find the set of structural parameters such that the model generates
a simulated dataset that resembles the real dataset as close as possible along the measures
of these auxiliary models. For a more detailed theoretical discussion, we refer readers to
Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) and Altonji, Smith and Vidangos (2013).
1.4.2 Auxiliary Model
In indirect inference, the choice of auxiliary models is as much art as science. In choosing
auxiliary models in our estimation exercises, we seek to select aspects of the labor market
that are of our main research interests and the focus of our structural model. We use
the empirical models presented in Section 2 as auxiliary models for our indirect inference
estimations. Namely, labor market mobility in EE and EU transition rates (we use the first
differenced estimates on EE and EU for the first three periods, giving us 6 parameters in
total), moments on hours of work and wage within job spells (as in Table 1.6. This gives us
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8 parameters in total), Mincer Wage Equation estimations (the three coefficient estimates
on tenure) and the within-contract group income inequality in distribution and growth rate.
In order for the model to reproduce the cross-sectional income distributions and reflect the
income inequality at the top percentiles both within and across contract groups, we choose
more percentiles at the top: 4 high percentile income levels at 96, 90, 84, 80, and two low
percentiles: 60 and 24. We supplement these auxiliary models with additional parameters
for the purpose of identification. We include the ratio of performance pay jobs at both
the upper and lower half of education levels within each group. We also use the following
wage regression on hours and its estimated coefficient on growth trend t ∗hijt to capture the
increase in hours productivity:
wijt = X
′
itγ + g(t) + β1hijt + β2t ∗ hijt + δij + ξt + εijt
where Xit represents worker characteristics including age and marital status, g(t) is workers’
experience, and t is the linear trend in years11. Table 1.6 shows auxiliary model estimates
from the PSID data across all groups.
1.4.3 Model Identification
Identification conditions of structural models in indirect inference estimation are difficult to
establish as clearly as well-studied methods such as GMM, especially given the complexity
and uniqueness of each structural model. The theoretical foundation rests on the mapping
between the structural parameters and the auxiliary models. In our case, it means that
identification requires one-to-one mapping between the structural parameters of the model
and the parameters from the auxiliary models, such that by matching auxiliary models from
the empirical data and the simulated data, we can back out the unique set of structural pa-
rameters that generate these auxiliary model results. A more formal theoretical perspective
11t= year - 1975, where 1975 is the earliest year in the panel.
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is discussed in Matzkin (2007), the key identification criteria rests on the “observationally
equivalent" condition. Given the difficulties in establishing theoretical identification, Monte
Carlo simulation is a practical method to check on the identification of the model locally.
For a more thorough discussion of the relevant theories, we refer readers to the indirect
inference theatrical literature such as Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) and Bruins
et al. (2015). In addition, Altonji, Smith and Vidangos (2013) has extensive discussion on
the use of Monte Carlo simulation to check on local identification conditions.
Although identification of structural models in indirect inference is very difficult to pin
down theoretically and not a common exercise in the structural labor literature, there are a
few important linkages between our model and the choice of auxiliary models that are crucial
in recovering the structural parameters from the PSID data. In the following, we lay out a
brief discussion on some of the key aspects of model identification.
1.4.3.1 Identification on Productivity Growth
There are three sources of productivity growth in our model: growth in firm productivity
pj, growth in the productivity of hours φj and effort γj. Since our data spans from 1975 to
1996, we need to disentangle these growth elements. In our data, we do not have firm level
information, which limits the modeling of firm level productivity growth. To mitigate this
problem, we use the Total Factor Productivity estimates for U.S during that period. See
Figure 1.1. For each year of observation in our simulations, we add the corresponding rates
of productivity growth as productivity shock. To account for the increase in productivity
in hours, we add wage regression on hours to the auxiliary model. As described in the pre-
vious section, the coefficient on hour-related wage growth t ∗ hijt captures the increase in
productivity in hours, and by matching the auxiliary model estimates in our simulations, we
pin down the hour-related growth rate φ¯t. Having accounted for the first two elements of
productivity growth, we are left with the productivity growth in effort, which is unobserv-






















Figure 1.1: Total Factor Productivity. Source: FRED
1.4.3.2 Identification on Wage Contract
The choice of contracts observed in the data helps estimate the distributions of monitoring
cost, returns to effort, as well as distribution of worker’s ability (Mj, γj, αi), as shown in
Equation 1.3.1. In our model, monitoring cost and returns to effort (Mj, γj) are drawn from
the same underlying distribution for every worker. To allow for heterogeneity on the choice of
wage contract at the worker level, we use heterogeneity in uncertainty about worker’s ability,
σ2i . We assume that the level of uncertainty is related to the observable characteristics of the
worker: σ2i = κα ∗ αˆi. In our auxiliary model, the ratio of performance pay jobs at different
education level helps pin down the uncertainty parameter κα. The group differences between
fixed wage and performance pay job spells in labor income and employment-to-unemployment
rate also helps to pin down the distribution of (Mj, γj, αi) because the performance pay
contract is inherently better at inducing more efficient level of effort and higher output. It
will be reflected in the labor income differences between groups, and also the productivity
gain will make employment relationship more robust to negative productivity shocks, which
translates into lower separation rate for performance pay jobs.
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1.4.3.3 Identification on Parameters and their Distributions
The productivity of hours φijt is estimated through the auxiliary model on the distribution
of working hours. The cross-sectional distribution of hours of work hij helps us pin down the
average level of productivity φj, and the variation of working hours within job spells helps to
estimate the distribution of productivity shock ε(φ)jt. The Mincer wage equation estimates
the average wage growth for workers as they accumulate more working experience, it is re-
lated to two factors in the model. First, worker’s productivity growth trend g(t) contributes
to wage increase over time. Second, workers will gradually negotiate up their wage with the
employer through outside offers, as time progresses they are more likely to receive outside
offer (each period there is probability λ1 of receiving an outside offer). The cross-sectional
distribution of labor income is helpful for pinning down the average level of productivity ele-
ments (pj, θi, g(t), γjt, φjt, hijt, εijt) and their dispersions. The employment transition rates in
the auxiliary models, including employment-to-employment, employment-to-unemployment
rates are very important in the estimation of transition probability parameters (λ0, λ1, µ, δ, κ)
and the distribution of firm level productivities (pj, γj,Mj). Employment-to-employment
transition rates depend on the probability of receiving outside job offers λ1 and the joint
distribution of (pj, γj,Mj), since the worker will only transfer to another job if the new em-
ployment match has higher productivity. Employment-to-unemployment transition depends
on both the endogenous and exogenous separation rates (τ, δ, µ), and the dispersion of ran-
dom productivity shocks ε˜ijt = εijt + ξ(φjt) will determine the endogenous separation rate.
The unemployment-to-employment transition rates depend on the likelihood of matching
rate with outside firm λ0.
1.4.4 Numerical Implementation
For each routine iteration, we simulate the entire employment and wage conditions for 20000
workers over 50 periods. We use python script to perform all the simulation and optimization
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routines. Python libraries such as NumPy and SicPy come handy in our estimation tasks,
enabling easy coding and fast computing. To speed up the huge amount of computing
task in each iteration, we vectorize the simulation process in NumPy, whose data structure
enables fast implementation of large scale calculations. To minimize the objective function,
we use a combination of optimization algorithms in order to search for the global minimizer
and understand how the model behaves over a wide range of parameter spaces. As the
structural model creates a nonlinear mapping between parameters of interest and auxiliary
models, traditional gradient-based optimization methods such as Newton-Raphson could
not be applied. Instead, we reply on non-gradient-based methods such as simplex algorithm
Nelder-Mead, stochastic algorithm Basin-hopping, conjugate direction algorithm Powell’s
method, and stochastic population based method Differential evolution. Methods such as
modified Powell and Basin-hopping are useful in searching for proper initial guesses over
large parameter space, and Nelder-Mead is ideal for yielding the eventual estimates with local
optimization. The SciPy library in Python allows easy implementation of these optimization
tasks.
1.4.5 Structural Parameters
The structure parameter set to be estimated is sufficient to completely characterize and
simulate each worker’s labor market employment and wage in each period. Some of them
characterize the underlying labor market structure, such as bargaining power, some of them
characterize the uncertainties in the job search process and the probabilistic distributions of
productivities. We have the following structural parameters in the data:
Bargaining power of worker, β. Labor market mobility probabilities: (λ0,λ1,µ, δ, κ), the en-
dogenous separation probability τ is calculated from the model using given structure param-
eters. Distribution parameter for firm’s productivity: (pmin, ν1, ν2); individual productivity
(θ¯, σθ); individual ability (α¯, σ2α, κα); returns to effort (γ¯, σ2γ, σ2ε(γ)) and returns to working
hours (φ¯, σ2φ, φ¯t, σ2ε(φ)). Parameter governing worker’s disutility of working ω; support for the
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(uniform) distribution of monitoring cost: (Mmin,Mmax); parameters for the human capital
accumulation: (ψ1, ψ2, ψ3). Random shocks to productivity (η, σ2µ).
Table 1.7 lists the estimation results for the three education groups. Overall we find
the simplex algorithm Nelder-Mead to be the most efficient and better at finding global
minimums of objective function. We find the structural parameters to be quite stable across
all the education groups. Bargaining power is estimated at about 0.5 for all three groups,
this is a bit different from the estimates in Bagger et al. (2014), where the bargaining
power is estimated at about 0.3. In addition to using a different labor market dataset, the
differences in bargaining power estimates might also be due to the fact that we are not
using the empirical firm productivities. Bargaining power is found to be larger in higher
education groups, which is consistent with intuition and most empirical findings. Labor
market mobility is similar across education groups. Our estimates show that workers with 12
to 14 years of education (in the middle education group) have higher probability of receiving
outside offers. This might be due to the fact that higher education groups have relatively
more stable jobs while low education group workers often have difficulties finding new jobs.
Firm productivity is found to be higher for higher education groups. We also find that the
scale of productivity distribution is quite different in low education groups. This probably
corresponds to the relatively large income gap at high percentiles for that group. Individual
productivity and ability are also found to be on average higher in higher education groups.
We also find the cross-sectional dispersion of working hour productivity to be quite low, this
is partly due to the fact that the mathematical solution to working hours is quite sensitive to
hour productivity, any large disturbance will create big cross-sectional differences in working
hours.
1.4.6 Evaluation of Model Fit
Table 1.8 shows the numerical model fit for all the auxiliary model parameters. Overall,
our model is able to capture the key aspects of employment and wage dynamics for each
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education group.
The model is able to generate labor market mobility for the first three initial periods
quite similar to the mobility in PSID data, particularly for employment-to-unemployment
transition rates. For employment to employment transition rates (job switch), the model
has a bit difficulty in generating first period transition rates close enough to the PSID data,
especially for fixed wage jobs. One reason is that there often is quite a big gap between the
first period and follow-on period transition rates. For example, the 3 period EE transition
rates for Education group 7-11 is (0.233, 0.091,0.075), the fitted transition rates from model
simulation are (0.186,0.091,0.075). Since our model keeps a constant probability of outside
job offers, it is unable to generate drastically different EE transition rates in the first few
periods. The slightly decreasing transition rates in our simulated model come from the fact
that the employment-worker match gets higher productivity over time, and becomes more
stabilized, as a result, it’s less likely for workers to find a higher outside option as time moves
on.
Our model is also able to generate pretty good fit for the distribution of working hours
and income both cross-sectionally and within job match. To simplify numerical estimation
procedures, we use the log of annual working hours and income to scale the numbers and
make the results less sensitive. The average and standard deviation of job spell income and
working hours are pinned down by the mean and standard deviation parameters related to
productivity variables: (γ¯, σγ, α¯, σα, θ¯, σθ). The cross-sectional average of within job spell
period to period variation of working hours and income are also captured well by the model
through the random dispersion structural parameters. However, our model is not able to
reproduce the cross-sectional heterogeneity of within job variations in working hours and
income, as shown in the table. One reason is that we do not allow for different random
dispersion parameters for different individuals, as a result, each job spell has very similar
level of within job dispersion in working hours and income. One remedy for this is to allow
for heterogeneity in dispersion variables such as (σγ, σθ). For example, in Bagger et al.
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(2014), the labor market mobility is allowed to be heterogenous across workers by specifying
a flexible functional form between individual ability and labor market mobility. To get a
better model fit, one could try making desperation variables tied to each individual’s ability
or productivity. We consider this to be an issue that could be improved upon through future
research.
Our model does a pretty good job in capturing the cross-sectional distributions of labor
income. We are able to get a close fit for all of the six percentile measures of average job
spell annual income. Furthermore, the model is able to differentiate the income level at
each percentile for all the contract and education groups: at a give percentile, the simulated
income level is higher for higher education groups and performance pay groups, which is
consistent with the PSID data. This is a very important aspect of our structural model
because the good fit means the model captures the income inequality aspect of the data
pretty well, and we can use it to study the effects of various modeling factors through
counterfactual analysis. At each percentile. Figure 1.6 plots the simulated distribution of
annual labor income, by contract and education group. Our model captures the fixed wage
contract group distribution extremely well, while also produces the income gap between
performance pay jobs and fixed wage jobs at high percentiles. The model fit is not as ideal
for performance pay, since our structural model tends to smooth over income across all
the distributions, while empirically there is a pretty sudden jump for performance pay jobs
in high income percentiles. Fortunately in our simulated results, the income gap between
contract group is indeed increasing at higher percentile.
1.5 Counterfactual Evaluations
With our structural model and estimated parameters, we can evaluate the effects of different
factors on worker’s labor market experience, and the overall labor market income distribu-
tions. To simply numerical results, we look at the education group 12-14. We focus on three
elements of the model: 1). Productivity growth; 2). Wage contract; 3). Search intensity. By
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modifying elements of the structural model, we simulate data under different hypothetical
conditions. We are interested in evaluating how these factors affect the labor market income
distribution.
1.5.1 Counterfactual: Productivity Growth
First, we evaluate how the change in different productivity factors affects income distribu-
tions. We focus on the four productivity elements in the model: firm productivity, worker’s
individual productivity, productive returns to working hours and effort. We are interested in
how the overall growth in productivity affects income distribution, and how the dispersion
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Figure 1.1: Counterfactual: productivity growth and income distribution
Figure 1.1 shows the counterfactual analysis for the growth of productivity. We focus
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on the effect on income distribution, and in particular, whether different productivity factors
have different implications on the income polarization at the top. To simply the analysis, we
choose to increase the average level of the productivity distribution by 10%. (correspond-
ingly: pmin, θ¯, φ¯, γ¯). The top 2 figures in the graph shows the hypothetical (annual labor)
income distribution if there were a 10% increase in average firm productivity or individual
productivity, respectively. Comparing these two figures, it’s interesting to see the differences
in top percentile income: while the increase in individual productivity leads to a uniform
increase in income across the entire distribution, the income increases are much larger at
the top percentiles for firm productivity increase. This is related to the different roles these
factors are playing in our model: individual productivity more or less serves as a fixed level
component for each worker, it affects the cross-sectional income distribution only through
the production channel. In comparison, firm’s productivity also plays an important role in
the labor market mobility process: through outside offer, workers will have the opportunity
to move up to more productive firms, or negotiate better wage contracts. As a result, an
increase in the average firm productivity level is going to allow workers at top income per-
centiles to gain higher income.
The bottom two figures show the different effects of productivity increase to working hours
and effort. The increase in working hour productivity shows a relatively flat increase in
income across all the percentiles at the distribution. In contrast, there is a big polarization
effect for the increase in effort productivity: there is a much lager increase in income for top
percentile performance pay jobs, while for fixed wage jobs the increase is much larger at the
lower end. At top percentiles of fixed wage jobs, the increase is almost minimal. This is due
to the fact that an increase in returns to effort will lead to a higher likelihood of choosing
performance pay jobs, which means that top income fixed wage jobs will be transformed into
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Figure 1.2: Counterfactual: productivity dispersion and income distribution
Similarly, Figure 1.2 shows the counterfactual analysis for increased dispersion of pro-
ductivity and its effect on income distribution. In our analysis, we increase the standard
deviation of these four productivity elements by 10%, based on the originally estimated
structural parameters. Similar to the effect of increased productivity level, we see a (slightly)
larger income increase at top percentiles for firm productivity than individual productivity.
Comparing the returns to hours with the returns to effort, we also find a larger polarization
effect in effort productivity.
Our counterfactual analysis on productivity growth shows that changes in different pro-
ductivity elements have different implications for income inequality, especially considering
different wage contracts. Returns to effort have a much larger effect on income polarization
at the top end.
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1.5.2 Counterfactual: Wage Contract
Second, we evaluate the effect of wage contracts on income distributions. As constructed
in our model, the choice of wage contracts depends on monitoring cost, which is a proxy
for the feasibility of monitoring worker’s effort or measuring worker’s output. To that end,
we perform counterfactual analysis on two cases: first, we want to evaluate how monitoring
cost affects the income distribution in the labor market; second, we want to understand how
performance pay as a labor market contracting technology contributes to income inequality.
The top two graphs in Figure 1.3 show the results. The left side graph shows the effect
of a reduction in monitoring cost on income distribution, and in particular, in comparison
to an increase in the productivity of worker effort. We take the baseline distribution of
monitoring cost in our estimation for education group 12-14 and reduce the corresponding
lower and upper bonds of the (uniform) distribution by 10%.12 As shown in the graph,
monitoring cost affects income distribution of the two contract groups differently. For the
performance pay contract group, a reduction in monitoring cost increases income at each
percentile for a similar magnitude; for fixed wage contract group, it has little effect on
income at low percentiles, while the income at high percentiles has decreased. This is because
with the reduction in monitoring cost, the previous top earners in fixed wage group have
shifted to using performance pay, and at the same time, low income group has the same
income distribution since monitoring cost does not directly affect the payout for fixed wage
workers. The comparison with the growth of productivity in effort is even more telling:
the productivity growth creates a disproportionate increase in top percentile income for the
performance pay group and increases income at lower percentile for the fixed wage group.
The almost reverse effects of productivity growth and monitoring cost on income at the two
ends of the income spectrum are due to the fact that monitoring cost only serves as a cutoff for
the choice of wage contracts, while productivity growth creates a disproportionate increase
in the marginal return to effort at the high end. The right side graph at the top half in Figure
12from [2.5, 5.8] to [2.2,5.2]
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1.3 shows the income distribution when performance pay contracts are shut down and only
fixed wage contracts are allowed. Consistent with previous results, the impact on income
is larger at higher percentiles of the distribution since performance pay is a channel that
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Figure 1.3: Counterfactual: Monitoring Cost, Performance Pay Contract and Search Inten-
sity
1.5.3 Counterfactual: Search Intensity
We also use counterfactual experiments to evaluate the effects of search intensity on income
distribution and labor market mobility. In contrast to direct search models, the search
intensity in our modeling framework is exogenous. It affects a worker’s income mainly
through two channels. First, it impacts the worker’s wage rate since the possibility of outside
job offers will be factored into the wage bargaining process as worker’s outside options;
second, it affects the worker’s labor market mobility through affecting the probability of
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worker’s transition into higher paying jobs. The left side graph at the bottom in Figure 1.3
shows income distribution with different levels of search intensity. We take the estimated
intensity λ1 = 0.7 as a baseline and experiment higher and lower intensities at λ1 = 0.9 and
λ1 = 0.5. As the graph shows, search intensity has a larger effect on income distribution at
the lower percentile. This is because a higher (lower) search intensity has a larger positive
(negative) effect on the low income group through both channels: more frequent job search is
more likely to yield match with higher paying jobs for low income workers, and the increased
matching probability will also be factored into the contract at the time of wage bargaining.
The right side of the graph shows the one-period job to job transition rates with different
search intensities across the income spectrum. Again, search intensity has a larger effect on
job mobility at the lower end of the income spectrum, because random job search implies a
higher probability of productivity-increasing matching for low productivity jobs.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study wage contract and worker’s wage and employment dynamics. We
find strong evidence in the data that the labor market mobility, returns to tenure, wage
growth and working hours are quite different between job spells under fixed wage contracts
and performance pay contracts. Furthermore, the labor income gap is concentrated on the
top percentiles for performance pay jobs, contributing to both within and across contract
group income inequality, especially for low education groups. We further develop a dynamic
structural model that incorporates the endogenous choice of wage contracts, and describes
workers’ labor market experiences over their careers. We then apply the model to structural
estimation. Our estimation results suggest cross-group differences in the underlying factors
in the labor market, and the model does a good job in explaining important empirical aspects
of the labor market data.
From the empirical evidences on the employment and wage dynamics, we highlight the
differences across contract groups on labor market mobility: employment relationships are
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more stable under performance pay jobs, workers are less likely to switch to another firm
or being laid off by their employers. The differences are consistent through all education
groups and also in the subsample in which workers have experiences under both types of
employment contracts.
Our model focuses on wage, working hours, the job change and termination process, as
well as cross sectional labor income distribution. We differentiate contracts through flexibility
in the wages as well as the uncertainties on productivity: performance pay can link labor
income to eventual production outcome, therefore working hours will be more responsive to
ex-post productivity shock. Moreover, it creates a channel through which firms and workers
can share risks unknown prior to contract signing, making the employment relationship more
resilient.
Our structural estimation seeks to uncover group-wise differences underlying the labor
market, such as workers’ bargaining power, the heterogeneity of firm and worker productivity,
and also the magnitude of different productivity shocks, in a bid to offer more insights into
the structure of the labor market. Through counterfactual analysis, we are able to show the
contribution of different productivity factors to income inequality.
We consider our contribution to the literature in three aspects: to the literature of in-
come inequality, we develop a structural model to evaluate the effects of various labor market
factors, and in particular, the role of wage contracts. Our work also brings a new perspective
to the research on “skill biased technological change". To the literature on performance pay,
we make extensions to the empirical study of labor contracts by exploring the cross contract
group differences in workers’ employment and earnings dynamics, instead of cross-sectional
differences. To the literature on structural labor and on the job search models, we show that
it’s important to recognize the differences on employment and wage processes between dif-
ferent types of employment contracts, and it’s possible to extend existing model frameworks
to properly factor in the contractural aspects for structural estimation.
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Figure 1.1: Wage-Tenure Profile from Mincer Equations (by education group)
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Income by Contract Group
*Data Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The graph shows the income distribution from PSID data on worker’s annual income. The
four graphs correspond to the entire sample set, and three subgroups by education level,
respectively. Each graph shows the distribution of average annual income (in logs) of every
job spell, by their wage contract type. To avoid outliers and top coding issue in PSID, we
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of 2-year Income Growth at Each Income Percentile
*Data Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The graph shows the distribution of 2-year labor income growth at each income percentile.
The four graphs correspond to the entire sample set, and the three subgroups by education
level, respectively. Income percentile is defined by the distribution of the average annual
labor income of each job spell in the sample. To avoid outliers and top coding issues in
PSID, we only keep percentiles between 4%-97%. Within each job spell, we calculate the
income growth rate of any 2-year gap observations, and take the median growth rate for each
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of 5-year Total Income by Contract Group
*Data Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The graph shows the distribution of 5-year total annual labor income (in logs) by contract
group. To avoid outliers and top coding issues in PSID, we only keep percentiles between
4%-97%. For the three graphs on the left side, we only include job spells that start before
1985. For the three graphs on the right side, we use all the job spells in the sample. For
each qualified job spell, we start with the earliest period of observation, and calculate the
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Figure 1.6: Model Fit: Distribution of Income by Contract Group
*Data Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The graph shows the income distribution from PSID data on worker’s annual income and the
model fit from simulation. We use estimated structural parameters to generate simulated
labor market data and estimate the distribution of annual income.
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Parameter Edu:7-11 Edu:12-14 Edu:15-20
Full Fixed PPJ Full Fixed PPJ Full Fixed PPJ
1− SˆEE(1) 0.2203 0.2332 0.0614 0.2239 0.2501 0.0500 0.2164 0.2594 0.0614
SˆEE(1)− SˆEE(2) 0.0866 0.0908 0.0426 0.1031 0.1123 0.0511 0.1044 0.1181 0.0617
SˆEE(2)− SˆEE(3) 0.0895 0.0945 0.0407 0.0862 0.0907 0.0638 0.0810 0.0899 0.0559
SˆEE(3)− SˆEE(4) 0.0582 0.0611 0.0328 0.0579 0.0604 0.0455 0.0566 0.0580 0.0545
SˆEE(4)− SˆEE(5) 0.0386 0.0399 0.0286 0.0483 0.0490 0.0459 0.0418 0.0399 0.0495
SˆEE(5)− SˆEE(6) 0.0357 0.0338 0.0556 0.0459 0.0495 0.0268 0.0419 0.0383 0.0549
SˆEE(6)− SˆEE(7) 0.0604 0.0623 0.0343 0.0426 0.0425 0.0450 0.0550 0.0500 0.0725
SˆEE(7)− SˆEE(8) 0.0311 0.0325 0.0206 0.0275 0.0292 0.0226 0.0230 0.0232 0.0248
1− SˆEU(1) 0.1002 0.1066 0.0223 0.0767 0.0874 0.0060 0.0497 0.0625 0.0033
SˆEU(1)− SˆEU(2) 0.0535 0.0578 0.0126 0.0466 0.0541 0.0089 0.0365 0.0460 0.0109
SˆEU(2)− SˆEU(3) 0.0658 0.0725 0.0073 0.0436 0.0522 0.0051 0.0272 0.0343 0.0104
SˆEU(3)− SˆEU(4) 0.0531 0.0574 0.0184 0.0415 0.0487 0.0100 0.0251 0.0300 0.0149
SˆEU(4)− SˆEU(5) 0.0504 0.0554 0.0109 0.0343 0.0402 0.0083 0.0296 0.0395 0.0088
SˆEU(5)− SˆEU(6) 0.0357 0.0343 0.0488 0.0340 0.0383 0.0160 0.0217 0.0220 0.0281
SˆEU(6)− SˆEU(7) 0.1307 0.1407 0.0204 0.0874 0.1002 0.0375 0.0878 0.0986 0.0679
SˆEU(7)− SˆEU(8) 0.0217 0.0214 0.0252 0.0121 0.0115 0.0153 0.0189 0.0237 0.0103
Table 1.2: Kaplan-Meier estimates of Labor Market Transition Dynamics
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Parameter Edu:7-11 Edu:12-14 Edu:15-20
Full Fixed PPJ Full Fixed PPJ Full Fixed PPJ
ξ11 0.0665 0.0955 0.1820 0.0725 0.0744 0.1346 0.0501 0.0652 0.0434
(0.0068) (0.0093) (0.0515) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0130) (0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0110)
ξ12 -0.0019 -0.0046 -0.0091 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0079 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0023
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0035) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0008)
ξ13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ξ21 0.0201 0.0121 0.1808 0.0553 0.0567 0.0010 0.1000 0.0911 0.0754
(0.0162) (0.0162) (0.1235) (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0198) (0.0083) (0.0101) (0.0204)
ξ22 -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0039 -0.0015 -0.0017 0.0014 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0013
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0042) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0008)
ξ23 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
N 9789 8632 1157 33718 26856 6862 13336 9202 4134
Table 1.3: Mincer Wage Equation Estimates
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Parameter Edu:7-11 Edu:12-14 Edu:15-20
Full Fixed PPJ Full Fixed PPJ Full Fixed PPJ
ζ1 0.2604 0.2282 0.4691 0.2165 0.2101 0.2479 0.1817 0.2010 0.1451
(0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0646) (0.0078) (0.0087) (0.0178) (0.0109) (0.0141) (0.0168)
ζ2 -0.0367 -0.0317 -0.0700 -0.0281 -0.0282 -0.0308 -0.0197 -0.0227 -0.0139
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0108) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0025)
ζ3 0.0012 0.0011 0.0025 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0006 0.0007 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
N 6591 5669 922 23291 17700 5591 9751 6334 3417
Table 1.4: Wage Growth Estimates
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Stats Edu:7-11 Edu:12-14 Edu:15-20
Full Fixed PPJ Full Fixed PPJ Full Fixed PPJ
mean of Hour Mean 2050.9 2018.6 2292.2 2132.8 2104.4 2246.0 2183.5 2130.3 2302.7
sd of Hour Mean 472.6 464.6 463.2 420.3 411.7 435.1 420.3 418.5 399.8
mean of Hour SD 403.0 386.8 524.1 364.5 355.6 399.9 348.4 355.2 333.0
sd of Hour SD 336.5 325.4 390.5 310.6 305.6 327.6 297.5 295.0 302.7
mean of Log-wage Mean 9.2 9.1 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.6 9.8 9.7 10.0
sd of Log-wage Means 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
mean of Log-wage SD 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4
sd of Log-wage SD 1.0 0.9 1.3 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.9
Number of job matches 1407 1241 166 4636 3706 930 1720 1189 531
Table 1.5: Within job match hour/wage moments
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Parameter Edu:7-11 Edu:12-14 Edu:15-20
Fixed PPJ Fixed PPJ Fixed PPJ
Labor Market Mobility
Transition EE1 0.233 0.061 0.250 0.050 0.259 0.061
Transition EE2 0.091 0.043 0.112 0.051 0.118 0.062
Transition EE3 0.095 0.041 0.091 0.064 0.090 0.056
Transition EU1 0.107 0.022 0.087 0.006 0.063 0.003
Transition EU2 0.058 0.013 0.054 0.009 0.046 0.011
Transition EU3 0.073 0.007 0.052 0.005 0.034 0.010
Wage growth
Mincer tenure1 0.096 0.182 0.074 0.135 0.065 0.043
Mincer tenure2 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 -0.008 -0.002 -0.002
Mincer tenure3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Working Hours (in logs)
h mean of mean 7.520 7.639 7.589 7.650 7.605 7.692
h sd of mean 0.384 0.377 0.316 0.325 0.285 0.278
h mean of sd 0.288 0.343 0.228 0.242 0.222 0.190
h sd of sd 0.523 0.587 0.431 0.450 0.398 0.415
Annual Income (in logs)
w mean of mean 9.152 9.577 9.401 9.613 9.772 10.024
w sd of mean 1.026 1.209 0.818 0.948 0.716 0.783
w mean of sd 0.580 1.075 0.464 0.625 0.426 0.491
w sd of sd 0.978 1.352 0.857 1.059 0.776 0.932
Average Job Spell Income Distribution
96th percentile 10.085 12.195 10.210 11.661 10.588 11.325
90th percentile 9.795 11.509 9.949 10.330 10.267 10.717
84th percentile 9.618 10.592 9.807 10.093 10.118 10.522
80th percentile 9.530 10.169 9.726 9.994 10.044 10.450
60th percentile 9.135 9.430 9.391 9.644 9.752 10.139
24th percentile 8.405 8.853 8.723 9.085 9.105 9.575
Percentage of ratio of Performance Pay jobs (by education)
Upper Half 0.075 0.156 0.208
Lower Half 0.061 0.110 0.205
Hour Rate Growth
year*log_hour coefficient 0.091 0.088 0.069
Table 1.6: Auxiliary Model parameters across groups
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Parameter (by Education) 7-11 12-14 15-20
Bargaining Power: β 0.469 0.516 0.669
Labor Market Mobility: λ1 (outside offer) 0.651 0.702 0.582
λ0 (getting employed) 0.824 0.838 0.877
δ (job separation) 0.065 0.055 0.039
µ (leaving labor force) 0.002 0.003 0.002
Firm Productivity: ν2 (distribution shape) 1.101 1.760 0.999
ν1 (distribution scale) 8.055 3.713 3.648
pmin (distribution support) 1.242 1.931 2.164
Individual Productivity : θ¯ (average level) 1.103 1.447 1.390
σθ (dispersion) 0.866 0.905 0.568
Individual Ability : α¯ (average level) 3.664 4.616 5.168
σα (dispersion) 1.427 1.658 1.515
κα (uncertainty) 0.352 0.541 0.397
Returns to Effort : γ¯ (average level) 1.464 1.613 1.535
σγ (dispersion) 0.340 0.574 0.310
σε(γ) (growth over time) 0.531 1.024 1.230
Returns to Hours: φ¯ (average level) 2.964 3.216 3.258
φ¯t (average growth rate) 0.015 0.012 0.016
σφ (dispersion) 0.227 0.221 0.218
σε(φ) (volatility) 0.325 0.415 0.432
Disutility of Working : ω (hωt ) 1.427 1.454 1.462
Monitoring Cost : Mmin (lower bound) 3.017 2.554 2.384
Mmax (upper bound) 6.014 5.874 5.841
Productivity Growth g(t) : ψ1 (ψ1t) 0.068 0.069 0.095
ψ2 (ψ2t2) -0.000 -0.004 -0.006
ψ3 (ψ3t3) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Random Productivity Shock : η (εit+1 = ηεit + uit) 0.051 0.138 0.068
σu (uit ∼ N(0, σ2u)) 0.564 0.605 0.577
Table 1.7: Structural Parameter Estimation Results, by Education Group
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Parameter Edu:7-11 Edu:12-14 Edu:15-20
Fixed (Sim) PPJ (Sim) Fixed (Sim) PPJ (Sim) Fixed (Sim) PPJ (Sim)
Labor Market Mobility
Transition EE1 0.233 (0.186) 0.061 (0.081) 0.250 (0.113) 0.050 (0.094) 0.259 (0.160) 0.061 (0.125)
Transition EE2 0.091 (0.091) 0.043 (0.052) 0.112 (0.111) 0.051 (0.080) 0.118 (0.115) 0.062 (0.083)
Transition EE3 0.095 (0.075) 0.041 (0.320) 0.091 (0.087) 0.064 (0.051) 0.090 (0.077) 0.056 (0.046)
Transition EU1 0.107 (0.100) 0.022 (0.030) 0.087 (0.077) 0.006 (0.007) 0.063 (0.050) 0.003 (0.005)
Transition EU2 0.058 (0.045) 0.013 (0.024) 0.054 (0.042) 0.009 (0.004) 0.046 (0.032) 0.011 (0.021)
Transition EU3 0.073 (0.045) 0.007 (0.013) 0.052 (0.040) 0.005 (0.004) 0.034 (0.031) 0.010 (0.022)
Wage growth
Mincer tenure1 0.096 (0.056) 0.182 (0.113) 0.074 (0.098) 0.135 (0.075) 0.065 (0.048) 0.043 (0.070)
Mincer tenure2 -0.005 (-0.000) -0.009 (-0.001) -0.003 (-0.001) -0.008 (-0.001) -0.002 (-0.001) -0.002 (-0.001)
Mincer tenure3 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Working Hours (in logs)
h mean of mean 7.520 (7.843) 7.639 (7.764) 7.589 (7.638) 7.650 (7.636) 7.605 (7.359) 7.692 (7.559)
h sd of mean 0.384 (0.411) 0.377 (0.376) 0.316 (0.291) 0.325 (0.294) 0.285 (0.166) 0.278 (0.188)
h mean of sd 0.288 (0.278) 0.343 (0.297) 0.228 (0.267) 0.242 (0.266) 0.222 (0.246) 0.190 (0.218)
h sd of sd 0.523 (0.093) 0.587 (0.109) 0.431 (0.094) 0.450 (0.096) 0.398 (0.135) 0.415 (0.165)
Annual Income (in logs)
w mean of mean 9.152 (9.117) 9.577 (9.428) 9.401 (9.431) 9.613 (9.472) 9.772 (9.336) 10.024 (10.045)
w sd of mean 1.026 (1.064) 1.209 (1.044) 0.818 (0.883) 0.948 (0.850) 0.716 (0.561) 0.783 (0.649)
w mean of sd 0.580 (0.295) 1.075 (0.645) 0.464 (0.350) 0.625 (0.466) 0.426 (0.147) 0.491 (0.371)
w sd of sd 0.978 (0.325) 1.352 (0.323) 0.857 (0.303) 1.059 (0.242) 0.776 (0.172) 0.932 (0.284)
Table 1.8: Indirect Inference Model Fit
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Parameter Edu:7-11 Edu:12-14 Edu:15-20
Fixed (Sim) PPJ (Sim) Fixed (Sim) PPJ (Sim) Fixed (Sim) PPJ (Sim)
Average Job Spell Income Distribution
96th percentile 10.085 (9.991) 12.195 (11.560) 10.210 (10.107) 11.661 (10.995) 10.588 (10.466) 11.325 (11.045)
90th percentile 9.795 (9.818) 11.509 (10.881) 9.949 (9.978) 10.330 (10.605) 10.267 (10.307) 10.717 (10.813)
84th percentile 9.618 (9.665) 10.592 (10.684) 9.807 (9.854) 10.093 (10.324) 10.118 (10.173) 10.522 (10.633)
80th percentile 9.530 (9.569) 10.169 (10.567) 9.726 (9.775) 9.994 (10.172) 10.044 (10.093) 10.450 (10.531)
60th percentile 9.135 (9.149) 9.430 (9.552) 9.391 (9.395) 9.644 (9.661) 9.752 (9.752) 10.139 (10.134)
24th percentile 8.405 (8.248) 8.853 (8.754) 8.723 (8.541) 9.085 (9.044) 9.105 (9.007) 9.575 (9.520)
Percentage of ratio of Performance Pay jobs (by education)
Upper Half 0.075 (0.073) 0.156 (0.142) 0.208 (0.213)
Lower Half 0.061 (0.058) 0.110 (0.115) 0.205 (0.196)
Hour Rate Growth
year*log_hour coefficient 0.09 (0.087) 0.088 (0.089) 0.069 (0.064)
Table 1.9: Indirect Inference Model Fit (cont)
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Chapter 2
Overtime Pay Regulations and Their Effects on Workers
Evidence from the 2004 rule change to Fair Labor Standard Acts
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2.1 Introduction
The impact of regulations on the labor market has always been a topic of debate. Free market
advocates argue that government interventions, such as minimum wage or statutory overtime pay
push prices in labor market away from efficient level, increasing the cost of labor and reducing output
and employment; workers’ rights advocates tend to welcome such regulations that are considered
to enhance fair labor compensation. Economic theories have different predictions on the effects
of overtime pay regulation. Standard competitive model predicts that hours would decrease for
workers since mandatory overtime pay increases the price of labor, and neoclassical labor-demand
theory suggests that firms would hire new workers to substitute for overtime labor. An alternative
view based on labor contract considers hours of work and compensation as bundled-terms in the
labor contract. In response to mandatory overtime pay premium, firms can choose to lower the
baseline wage rate so that worker’s income and hours of work remain the same. According to this
view, overtime pay regulation would have no effect on the labor market. The inconclusive prediction
on the effect of the regulation from different theories is often the focal point of policy debate and
disagreement.
In this paper, we study the impacts on workers from an amendment in 2004 to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) about statutory overtime pay premium. Under the new rule, the threshold
on wage for exemption from mandatory overtime pay was raised from $250 per week to $455 per
week, and the definition for jobs that are eligible for exemption were revised. Using labor market
data on workers’ income and hours of work that spans the period of rule change, we find evidence
that the 2004 FLSA rule change increased the wage and income for workers who gained coverage
of statutory overtime pay. We also find an increase in income and overtime pay premium for the
group of workers with similar job duties but a higher income that exempted them from statutory
overtime pay. Our results suggest that the standard competitive model does not capture well the
labor market for overtime work, and government regulations could reduce labor market frictions.
Empirical research on the effects of overtime pay regulation are relatively scarce compared to
minimum wage law. Costa (2000) studies the impact of FLSA on weekly working hours during
the period 1938-1950. By comparing the hours of work of wholesale trade workers to the hours
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of retail sales workers 1, she found a 5 percent reduction in standard working week hours. Trejo
(1991) evaluates two hypothetical models on the labor market response to rising overtime premium:
1. fixed wage model in which firms keep worker’s wage intact and reallocate overtime hours to new
employees ; 2. fixed job model in which firms choose to lower the wage rate so that worker would
still work the same hours and get the same income. Using data from Current Population Survey
(CPS) between 1974 and 1978, he found that wage does adjust lower in response to the overtime pay
regulation, but the adjustment is not large enough to offset the regulation. Trejo (1993) analyzes the
effect of labor unions on overtime compensation and hours. Using CPS data in 1985, he found that
unionization reduces overtime hours but increases the overtime pay premium. In another paper,
Trejo (2003) found that FLSA coverage has little effect on overtime hours in industries where FLSA
has expanded coverage. Rohwedder and Wenger (2015) studies the issue of violation of overtime
rules and found that 19 percent of hourly wage workers were paid less than “time-and-a-half", and
11 percent of salaried works who qualify for overtime pay did not receive any.
The research on overtime pay regulation belongs to the much larger body of research on labor
law and labor market institutions. A central question on this subject is how does labor market laws
and institutions affect labor market outcomes. Botero et al. (2004) investigates the regulation of
labor markets through employment laws, collective bargaining laws, and social security laws in 85
countries. They find that heavier regulation of labor is associated with a larger unofficial economy,
lower labor force participation, and higher unemployment. Besley and Burgess (2004) studies the
impact of labor regulations on manufacturing growth in India, and find that states which amended
labor laws in a pro-worker direction experienced lower output, employment, investment, and pro-
ductivity. Naidu and Yuchtman (2016) studies 19th century labor market institutions through the
perspective of labor market frictions and bargaining over rents between workers and employers,
and find suggestive correlations between labor strikes and wages. Naidu, Nyarko and Wang (2016)
studies a reform in the United Arab Emirates that relaxed restrictions on employer transitions, and
find an increase in incumbent migrants’ earnings and firm retention. The existing literature points
out the importance of law and institutions to the labor market, and the various mechanisms through
which they affect labor market outcomes.
1covered and not covered by FLSA, respectively
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In this paper, we first discuss a simple adverse selection model for overtime work to shed
light on the mechanisms through which mandatory overtime pay might affect workers’ hours and
income. In our model, workers have heterogenous preferences for leisure over overtime work, which
is unknown to the firm. Firms choose to offer a uniform overtime pay which might be rejected by
workers, and there is substitution of overtime work across groups of workers with different produc-
tivity. Our model gives testable predictions on the income and hours for workers with different
overtime pay statute. In our empirical section, we estimate the effects of the 2004 overtime rule
change on workers’ hours, income, and overtime wage premium. Using data from Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP), we construct a panel on workers’ income and hours of work that
covers the 2004 rule change.2 We categorize jobs into “Exempt’ and “Non-Exempt" groups based on
their income level, occupation, and whether they are salary workers or paid by the hour. Based on
that, we identify two groups of workers in the data: those who were most likely directly impacted
by the new overtime rule (workers whose status change from “exempt" to “non-exempt") and those
who had most likely remained exempted from overtime pay throughout the period of rule change.
We found that on average there is a 2 precent increase in weekly working hours and a 13% increase
in hourly rate for those directly impacted workers. Overtime pay premium on average increased for
this group of workers, but the effect is not significant. For workers who were always exempted from
overtime pay, we did not find any significant change in working hours, but there is some evidence
that overtime pay premium had increased for them.
Our research contributes to the study of overtime pay regulation and more generally labor
market laws in two aspects. First, we shed light on the policy debate about the efficacy of overtime
regulation on improving worker’s welfare by studying the most recent overtime rule change in 2004.
The existing literature, to a large extent, focuses either on overtime rules that were enacted several
decades ago or effects of the rules without the context of a regulation change, therefore, our research
provide a more up-to-date perspective on this issue. As the proposed new overtime rule3, which




raises the salary threshold for overtime pay exemption to $913 per week, is halted by the court4,
the discussion on overtime pay regulation is becoming even more relevant. Second, we add to the
literature on overtime pay regulation by examining a new dataset and using a new empirical model
for studying overtime pay premium. We construct panel dataset on workers’ income and hours
using different data sources and identify groups that are most likely directly impacted by the rule
change. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first panel study on the effects of overtime pay
rule. Taking advantage of the panel dataset, we use an empirical model to estimate the “overtime
wage premium" and the effect of overtime rule change on the premium. A common problem in
labor data for studying overtime pay is that we rarely have direct measures of the wage premium
since they are usually lumped together with baseline salary as the total labor income, and in the
few cases where such information is available, they are often not accurate enough. We model labor
income as the total of baseline salary and overtime compensation, and through variations of hours
of work within each job spell and the corresponding variations in income, we are able to identify
the overtime pay premium with respect to the baseline hourly wage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we lay out the adverse selection
model for overtime work, in section 3, we discuss the 2004 FLSA rule change, section 4 shows the
empirical models and results, section 5 concludes the paper.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Adverse Selection and Efficient Labor Supply
We consider a simple adverse selection model for overtime labor supply and compensation. First,
we use the model to describe the potential effects of a mandatory overtime pay on the labor supply
and wage for workers that are directly impacted by the law change. Then we extend the model to
incorporate the overtime labor demand and supply for workers of different income tiers. In particu-
lar, workers whose overtime pay statues are not directly affected by the law. In doing so, we are able
to explore the mechanisms through which mandatory overtime pay rule change for one particular




In our adverse selection model, firms expand production by having workers work extra hours.
At the same time, workers always prefer leisure to working if they were paid the same regardless. The
central issue here is the classic asymmetric information problem: worker’s true leisure preference is
often unknown to the firm. In order to gain as much surplus as possible, firms will have to decide
the uniform overtime compensation to the worker without knowing each worker’s true type. Our
model predicts a few different scenarios for the overtime work supply schedule. As common in the
adverse selection problem, it’s possible for labor market inefficiency to rise when workers with higher
preference for leisure gets priced out. The role of mandatory overtime pay in our model is to provide
a “floor" for overtime compensation, and the model provides predictions on overtime work and wage
rate that can be tested. In our model extension to multi-segments of workers, firms can assign
overtime task to workers of different productivity and overtime pay statue. In this way, we explore
a demand channel through which changes in mandatory overtime pay rule for one particular group
of workers could have a spill-over effect on other groups of workers. The model provides testable
predications on the overtime wage and labor supply for different groups.
2.2.2 Adverse Selection on Overtime Labor Supply
We first consider an adverse selection model on overtime compensation and labor supply for a ho-
mogenous group of workers with identical productivity but different preferences for leisure. We
consider a perfectly competitive labor market where workers are always compensated by their reser-
vation value for regular hour work, which is ω¯. This allows us to focus on the labor market for
overtime working.
Firms gain overtime output by θ. The productivity (demand) level θ is common knowledge.
Workers dislike working overtime with disutility γ ∈ {γL, γH}. Same as firm’s productivity, worker’s
overtime disutility (γL, γH) and their corresponding probability (1− pγ , pγ) are common knowledge
to both parties. We exclude trivial cases where it’s never efficient to work overtime (θ < γL < γH).
The difficulty in contracting overtime work lies in information asymmetry on worker’s side. Firms
face production uncertainty as it is difficult to anticipate demand in advance, oftentimes they only
find out if extra working hours from workers is necessary at the very end. On top of that, even if
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firms know the exact production demand for overtime beforehand, they have an incentive to hide
this information from workers so as to lower the wage. For workers in a competitive labor market,
the high type workers (γ = γH) have an incentive to hide their preference to avoid being edged
out by other workers with a lower preference for leisure (γ = γL). Therefore, we set up the model
in which overtime working is not specified in the labor contract. Instead, firms will make take-
it-or-leave-it offers to workers for overtime working whenever there is a demand. Formally, firms
would observe the overtime productivity at the end of each period to decided if they need to have
workers work overtime. When the overtime productivity is higher than worker’s reservation value
– disutility from working overtime, firms will request workers to stay on the job and work extra
hours. The overtime compensation will be chosen so as to maximize firm’s profit.
When γL < θ < γH , the overtime productivity is less than disutility of overtime working for
high type workers, there is no reason for the firm to expect high type workers to work overtime
since any profitable compensation offering will be rejected by the firm, therefore, firm will choose
to offer ωOT = γL as overtime pay, and only low type worker will choose to work.
When γL < γH < θ, it is always efficient to work overtime, since overtime productivity is al-
ways higher than disutility of working overtime. Firm have two choices on overtime compensation:
Choice 1. Offer ωOT = γL as overtime pay, workers of type γH will decline to work overtime, low
type workers γL will work overtime. Firm’s expected overtime profit depends on the probability
that a worker is of lower type: Ω(γL) = (1− pγ)(θ − γL)
Choice 2. Offer ωOT = γH as overtime pay, all the workers will agree to work overtime, firm’s
expected profit from overtime is Ω(γH) = θ − γH
Firms will choose to offer overtime wage that generates the highest profit. If Ω(γL) > Ω(γH),
firms will choose overtime wage γL, and vice versa:
ωOT =

γL if pγθ < γH − (1− pγ)γL
γH if pγθ > γH − (1− pγ)γL
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The choice of overtime wage depends on three key factors: 1). the higher proportion of high
type workers (pH), the more likely firm will offer high overtime compensation (γH) to encourage
overtime working; 2). the higher overtime working productivity (θ) is, the more likely for overtime
compensation to be high, since the profitability of added overtime working is more than enough to
cover for higher overtime pay; 3). the smaller the gap of overtime working disutility (γH − γL) is,
the more likely firms will offer high overtime wage, because firms only need to give up relatively
small level of rent to low type worker (γL) to induce high type worker (γH) to work overtime.
As a first-best efficient benchmark, workers should always be compensated properly to work
overtime whenever the productivity is higher than worker’s disutility (γ < θ). The adverse selection
could lead to inefficiency because the firm is essentially acting as a market monopoly and set uniform
price for overtime work. It is therefore possible for high type workers to be priced out of the market
even though it’s efficient for them to work overtime.
2.2.3 Adverse Selection with FLSA Overtime Pay
The FLSA on overtime pay requires that eligible workers be paid time and a half of regular wage rate
for overtime work. In our model, this means that there is a lower bound to overtime pay that firms
can offer to workers. For simplicity, we denote the time and half overtime pay as ωFLSA = 1.5ω¯.
The overtime wage offered by the firm would then have a lower bound: ωOT > ωFLSA.
The effect of such an overtime law on labor market outcome depends on how it affects the supply
and demand of overtime working. Firms will demand overtime from worker so long as the produc-
tivity is higher than the mandatory overtime pay ωFLSA; workers will supply overtime work if and
only if they are properly compensated for the extra hours of working. Here in the analysis, we only
consider the non-trivial case where the mandatory overtime pay is higher than low type overtime
wage (ωFLSA > γL). To that end, there are three basic scenarios for the impact of mandatory
overtime pay on overtime working.
Case 1: FLSA mandatory overtime pay has no impact on working hours.
When the mandatory overtime wage is lower than overtime productivity, firm will always find it
profitable to have workers work extra hours, and if the mandatory overtime wage is not high enough
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to induce high type worker to work, the law will not affect worker’s overtime supply. Overall, the
effect of the law is a welfare transfer from firm to workers.
Case 2: FLSA mandatory overtime pay decreases working hours.
When the mandatory overtime wage is higher than overtime productivity, overtime working becomes
inefficient for both parties. Firms will decrease their demand for overtime since they will have to
pay at a rate higher than what they could gain from it. In this case, overtime pay regulation will
push wage to outside of the efficient price range, and there will be no market for overtime working.
Case 3: FLSA mandatory overtime pay increases working hours.
When the mandatory overtime wage is lower than overtime productivity but higher than high type
worker’s disutility, it’s possible to increase overtime work efficiency if high type workers were priced
out of market absent the overtime pay mandate. In this case, overtime pay regulation not only
transfers welfare from firms to workers, but also increases overtime working to a more efficient level.
Table 2.5 summarizes all the possible cases. The impact of FLSA overtime pay will depend on
how it affects the existing structure of supply and demand for overtime work. It could lead to less
efficiency by pushing overtime rate high enough so as to make it unprofitable to the firm; or it could
merely function as a welfare transfer to move the rent from firms to workers while maintaining the
overtime work structure. Alternatively, it’s also possible to improve market efficiency by alleviating
the adverse selection problem for monopolistic firms. Our model, parsimonious as it is, is able
to capture the information asymmetry problem in the labor market for overtime work, and derive
testable alternatives to help understand the effect of the statuary overtime pay premium in FLSA.
Based on the model predictions, we will focus on its effect on working hours to see which scenario
best explains empirical evidence.
2.2.4 Adverse Selection on Multi-Segment of Workers
Now we consider an extension to the model where we include multi-segments of workers with different
productivity and overtime pay statue. There are three types of workers based on their income range:
(L,M,H). Workers of typeM are directly affected under the overtime pay rule change, group L and
H refers to workers whose income are below and above group M , respectively. For firms’ demand
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of overtime work, we consider 4 types of tasks: θ can only be assigned to low group L; θ¯ can only
be assigned to high group H; θL can be assigned to group L and M , the productivities are θLL
and θLM respectively; θH can be assigned to group M and H, the productivities are θHM and θHH
respectively. We also assume that worker’s income group is tied to her productivity: for the same
task, workers in a higher income group can produce more (θLL < θLM and θHM < θHH). For each
group of workers, we consider two sub-groups with different levels of preference for leisure: l and
h. Consistent with our baseline model in the previous section, we assume that worker’s preference
for leisure is unknown to the firm. We denote the preferences for leisure by worker group and type.
For example, low type worker of group M delegated to task θH has reservation value γlM . We
assume that high type worker always has a higher reservation value. (γlM < γ
h
M ). The distribution
associated with high and low type workers are (1− pL, pL), (1− pM , pM ), (1− pH , pH) for the three
groups L,M and H, respectively, and they are independent of task. Our model extension aims to
explore the substitution of overtime work across different types of workers: overtime task θL and θH
can be delegated to different worker groups, and change in overtime wage for one group of workers
has the potential to shift overtime demand from one group to another.
First, we consider task θH . It can be delegated to group H or M . Firms can either make an
overtime compensation offer to H or M group worker. If they offer it to H group worker first, some
workers might reject the overtime offer if the compensation is below their reservation value (γ). In
this case, firms will turn to M group workers and make them an offer that maximizes firms’ profits.
The situation is similar if firms choose to offer to group M workers first. Table 2.1 lists the six
scenarios and the corresponding firms’ profits.
Depending on the payoff structure, it’s possible that firms will delegate high level task θH
exclusively to group H or M . Or alternatively, firms can choose to prioritize group H or M and
make sequential overtime offers to the other group only when the initial overtime offer is rejected.
As shown in Table 2.1, when firm’s sequential offer is (γlH , γ
l




H), there’s a probability
that overtime demand not being met. Such inefficiency arises when workers with high preference
for leisure gets priced out due to adverse selection by the firm.
When overtime mandatory pay is enacted for group M workers, firms’ overtime offers for low type
workers will have to be raised to ωFLSA. We focus on the case where mandatory pay is in-between
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the high type and low type workers’ reservation value (γlM < ωFLSA < γ
h
M ). Two inefficient offers
will be directly impacted by the rule change: (γlH , γ
l




H). In addition, the rule change
would lower the corresponding payoffs for firms. Because the change decreases the payoff for a few
options of overtime compensation, it would only have an effect on equilibrium overtime hours and
compensation if the previous optimal offer by the firm was rendered less profitable than another
option. Table 2.2 lists the choices of overtime offer for task θH once the overtime mandatory pay
was enacted. Here we focus on two interesting cases where the law have different implications for
these two groups of workers.
Case 1. when firm’s initial optimal offer is (γlM , γ
l
H), as the effect of overtime law kicks in,
it’s possible for the firm to choose offer (γlH , γ
h
M )
5. In this case, conditional on a pending task θH ,
group H’s overtime probability will increase from pM (1− pH) to (1− pH), and group M ’s overtime
probability will depend on the relative magnitude of (1−pM ) and pH . As a result, we should expect
to see an increase in overtime hours for group H. For such a case, efficiency is improved in the
sense that overtime demand will always be met with supply6, because without mandatory overtime
pay, market will choose to offer low wage (γlM and γ
l
H) due to adverse selection, and the high type
workers are excluded.
Case 2. When the initial optimal offer is (γlM , γ
h





after the mandatory overtime pay7. In this case, conditional on a pending task θH , group H’s over-
time probability will change from pM to (1−pH), and group M ’s overtime probability will decrease
from (1 − pM ) to pH(1 − pM ). This is a scenario where the introduction of overtime pay does not
affect the adverse selection on high type workers in the targeted group (γhM ). Instead, firms switch
the offer priority from group M to H. In this sense, there is substitution of high type workers (H)
for medium type (M) because of the increase in overtime wage. An interesting result is that the
change in working hours is ambiguous for high type workers, even though the firm has substituted
H as first priority group, they might choose to exclude high type workers (γhH) because they can
5when (1 − pM )(θHM − γlM ) + pM (1 − pH)(θHH − γlH) > (1 − pH)(θHH − γlH) + pH(θHM − γhM ) and
(1− pM )(θHM − ωFLSA) + pM (1− pH)(θHH − γlH) < (1− pH)(θHH − γlH) + pH(θHM − γhM )
6even though the aggregate surplus will depend on the actual
7when (1 − pM )(θHM − γlM ) + pM (θHH − γhH) > (1 − pH)(θHH − γlH) + pH(1 − pM )(θHM − γlM ) and
(1− pM )(θHM − ωFLSA) + pM (θHH − γhH) < (1− pH)(θHH − γlH) + pH(1− pM )(θHM − ωFLSA)
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still make a sequential offer to group M . As a result, the substitution between high type and low
type workers due to the overtime pay rule change can lead to inefficient situations where there is a
lack of overtime labor supply.
The above two cases show that when there is substitution between workers of different level
of productivity, the introduction of mandatory overtime pay could have different implications for
overtime hours. It’s possible for group H and M workers’ overtime to either increase or decrease,
depending on the substitution pattern. In addition, we consider the implications for overtime wage
rate. Task θ¯ is exclusively reserved for high type workers. We assume that the productivity is high
enough such that firms will always offer a high rate γhH to make sure high type workers work. Case
1 shows that it could increase the overtime hours of H group workers at compensation γlH . Since
the overtime wage for H group consists of γhH from task θ¯ and γ
l
H from task θH , an increase in
hours means the average rate for overtime hours will decrease. Likewise, if in Case 2 the overtime
hours for group H is reduced, we should expect to see an increase in average rate for overtime.
Therefore, our model provides testable predictions: high type worker’s change in overtime hours
will be accompanied by a reverse change in overtime wage rate. The analysis for low type task θL
will be very similar to the high type task: it’s possible for group L type workers to either gain or
lose overtime working hours when there is a mandatory overtime pay increase for M type worker.
2.3 Overtime and FLSA
2.3.1 Background information
The federal overtime provisions are specified in the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA). The Act,
signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1938, was considered an important piece of
New Deal legislation. The Act introduced several key regulations on the labor market, including
40-hour work week, national minimum wage,“time and a half" overtime pay. Over the past two
decades, there has only been two majors changes to the overtime regulation. In 2004, the Bush
administration revised the overtime rules regarding exemption criteria, raising the salary benchmark
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from $250/week to $445/week 8 and redefining job duties that qualify for exemption. It was the first
major change on overtime rules since 1975. In 2016, the Department of Labor under the Obama
administration published a final rule that updates the exemption criteria for workers. Slated to take
effect on December 1st, 2016, the rule increased the salary threshold for exemption from $455 to
$913 per week. However, on November 22, 2016, a federal judge blocked the rule, deciding that it is
unlawful, and granted the motion for a nationwide injunction. As of today, the litigation regarding
the rule is still in the appeal process, and with the new administration in charge, the rule is very
much in jeopardy.
Overtime pay regulation has long been a controversial topic. Advocates calling for stricter
overtime rule and higher overtime pay argue that it protects workers’ rights and increase welfare for
workers. Those against government regulation think that it would make labor more costly, hurting
business, and they also question the effectiveness of the rules, since stricter overtime rules could
make employers reduce working hours or baseline salary, ultimately having little or even negative
impact on worker’s income. When the new regulations on overtime were issued by the Depart-
ment of Labor, they always came with specific policy goals and estimates of the impact on the
labor market. However, opinions varied a lot regarding the actual impact of the rules. In 2004,
the Department of Labor estimated that the updated rule would strengthen overtime protection
for millions of salaried workers, transfer about $375 million per year from employers to employees
in the form of greater overtime pay or higher base salaries. The total first year implementation
costs to employers are estimated to be $738.5 million, and only an estimated 107000 workers who
earn $100000 or more per year could lose their overtime protection. 9 Nonetheless, many were
critical of the new rule, saying that millions would lose eligibility of overtime pay because of the
new definition of job duties: administrative workers can be reclassified as “team leaders”, jobs such
as cook or nurses can be categorized as “learned professional". The economic impact of overtime
pay on workers was also heavily disputed, as some people suggested that baseline salary levels could
8There are two salary benchmarks in the previous rule, “long test" and “short test", with benchmark
$155/week and $250/week, respectively.
9Economic Report, the Department of Labor, 29 CFR Part 541, 2004, https:
www.dol.gov/whd/overtime/regulations.pdf
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be re-adjusted to a lower level so that workers who work overtime would still earn the same income
and work the same number of hours, rendering the new rule irrelevant.
Anecdotal examples on how the labor market adjusts to the overtime rule change are sporadic
and paints a quite complicated picture. First of all, employers do not always passively follow the
overtime rule as it is, they adjust to the rule change strategically. For example, in anticipation to
the new overtime rule, which increased the exemption threshold from $455 to $913 per week, Wal-
Mart raised the annual salaries for entry-level managers from $45000 to $48500 in order to avoid the
unpredictable costs for salary employees, since many of them work overtime and the hours fluctuates
from week to week.10 Secondly, the overtime eligibility are often subject to the interpretation of
the rule, and employers do not always enforce the rules strictly. In some firms, employees still get
overtime pay even though they are exempted under the rule 11; in some other cases, employers
withhold overtime pay from workers and it’s costly for workers to dispute, sometimes resulting in
class-action lawsuits 12. Sometimes, overtime-pay-exempted workers will still get compensated for
weekly hours exceeding 40 due to tight labor market conditions13.
2.3.2 2004 FLSA Rule Change
Most jobs in the United States are covered by the FLSA overtime provision, with few exceptions
such as employees on foreign vessels, workers engaged in fishing operations or newspaper delivery,
railroad and air carrier employees14. Workers covered by the overtime provision are either “Ex-
10Reuters News: http:
www.reuters.com/article/walmart-managers-overtime-idUSL1N1CH237
11The Record (New Jersey), August 15, 2004, “New Jersey employers confused about overtime eligibility
as deadline nears"– “Of course, employers are free to continue paying overtime to workers who aren’t covered
by the new rules. And, according to a survey by Hewitt, about a third of employers pay overtime to workers
who are not required by law to receive it."
12St. Petersburg Times (Florida), April 21, 2004, “Whitecollar OT rules are far from definitive" – “Phar-
macists, current and former photo lab managers and assistant store managers of the Eckerd drugstore chain
have filed class action lawsuits claiming the Largo company illegally denied them overtime."
13Las Vegas Review-Journal, August 24, 2004, “U.S. overtime rules to have little effect on Las Vegas
payrolls, officials say" – “ Registered nurses will no longer be entitled to overtime pay under the new law,
but the shortage of nurses may cause many hospitals to keep paying overtime anyway. North Vista Hospital
(formerly Lake Mead Hospital) will continue to pay overtime, human resources director Leanna Nalley said."
14For details, see “Handy Reference Guide to The Fair Labor Standards Act", Wage and Hour Division,
Department of Labor, https:
www.dol.gov/whd/overtime/fs17a_overview.pdf
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empted" or “Non-Exempted" for overtime pay. To be exempted, workers generally have to pass
three tests: 1. Salary basis test (the employee has to be paid on a salary basis); 2. Salary level
test (worker’s salary passes the designated threshold); 3. Duties test (workers need to have “white
collar job" that require relatively high-level work, including executive, professional jobs)15. The
2004 FLSA revisions made several significant changes to the overtime rule that was last revised in
1975, including:
1. Increased minimum salary level from $250 to $455 per week.
2. Revised “job duties" tests replacing the current “long" and “short" tests with a single “standard
duties" test for each exemption.
3. Highly compensated employees performing office or non-manual work whose annual salary is
above $100000 are exempted from FLSA.
Under the revised rule, the group of workers directly affected are those “white collar workers" whose
jobs satisfy the “Duties Test" description and have a salary between the old and new benchmark.
Their status would change from “Exempt" to “Non-Exempt" and therefore they would become en-
titled to earn overtime compensation for work week that exceeds 40 hours. In our empirical study,
we focus on two groups of workers: those whose overtime eligibility changed from “Exempt" to
“Non-Exempt" because of the revision, and those whose status have always remained “Exempt".
The main difference between these two groups is the salary level: the former has a salary level
between the old and new benchmark before the rule change16, the latter has a salary level above
the new benchmark $455 per week before the rule change. We use worker’s occupation and income
information to categorize their overtime eligibility. This approach is an approximation to worker’s
exemption status since we do not have direct information on their overtime eligibility. To the extent
that it classifies workers by their income and job, it allows us to study the effect on different groups
of workers that the rule intended to treat differently.
One big controversy about the 2004 new overtime rule was that many thought it would lead to
millions of workers losing overtime pay due to the redefined “Duties Test". The reasoning was that




employers could reclassify workers into “Administrative", “Executive" or “Professional" employees
so that they would pass the “Duties Test", especially since the description of duties had a lot
of ambiguities and were subject to interpretation. However, there isn’t much empirical evidence
supporting this, and anecdotal evidences are quite mixed. By comparing detailed descriptions of
job duties in the old and new overtime rules, there isn’t any distinctive evidence that the rule made
it easier for jobs to pass the “Duties Test"17. Furthermore, employers do not necessarily always
follow the overtime rule: some would withhold overtime pay because litigation is costly for workers,
some would pay for overtime hours, due to tight labor market supply, even though the employee is
exempted. Given the complicated reality of overtime status, our approach allows us to study the
aggregate effect on different worker groups. This classification method is also consistent with other
empirical studies on this topic. For example, in Trejo (1991), detailed occupation classifications
in the CPS were coded to determined the coverage status of each individual in the sample; in
economic reports and impact studies issued by the Department of Labor 18 19, information on
worker’s occupation were used to estimate the number of workers affected by overtime rules. To
make sure classification errors are not altering the empirical results, we perform sensitivity tests by
adding or removing different occupation categories into or from our group definitions, the results
are not sensitive to these changes.
2.4 Empirical Models and Results
2.4.1 Data
Our data comes from two sources: Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and Current
Population Survey (CPS). Both datasets offer unique advantages for studying this topic. CPS is a
relatively more representative sample on the U.S. labor market and previous research mostly relies
on it; SIPP offers a longer panel at monthly level and contains good quality information on worker’s
17The Department of Labor listed a comparison of duties tests on the website https:
www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/overtime/side-by-side_PF.htm
18Economic Report, the Department of Labor, 29 CFR Part 541, 2004, https:
www.dol.gov/whd/overtime/regulations.pdf




We use the 2004 SIPP panel dataset20 to study the effect of overtime rule change. Set D of the
panel contains data for analysis on labor force participation, employment, and earnings. The panel
spans from July 2003 to Dec 2008, therefore it allows us to have observations on workers’ income
and working hours before and after the rule change.
For CPS, the panel is constructed by merging survey data on the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups.
Every household in the CPS sample was interviewed consecutively for 4 months, then left out for 8
months, and interviewed again for 4 more months. Weekly hours and earning questions are asked
on their 4th and 8th interview. As new households enter into the survey each month, one fourth of
the households are in the outgoing rotation each month. Therefore, we have a balanced two-period
panel that spans exactly one year in-between observations. To study the effect of rule change, we
choose job spells with observations both before and after the rule change. In comparison to SIPP
which usually has 13 months of observation for each person, the CPS panel is much shorter in time
series.
2.4.2 Overtime Exemption Status Classification
The objective of categorizing workers is to study the impact on workers with different overtime
pay statue under the rule. We focus on two groups of workers. First, we are interested in those
who were directly impacted by the rule due to the increased salary benchmark. These are salary
workers whose jobs fit the descriptions of the duties test and earned salary between the old and new
benchmark. A key issue about overtime law is how effective mandatory overtime pay is at improving
worker’s welfare, since employers have many options to offset the intended policy outcome. The
second group we are interested in are workers who remained exempted from overtime pay during
the rule change period.
We classify workers mainly based on their income and occupation. Both SIPP and CPS data
have detailed occupation information based on four-digit Census Occupation Codes 21. First, we
identify the group of workers that are exempted from overtime pay directly. They are either ex-
20We thank Center for Economic and Policy Research for providing Uniform Extracts of SIPP datasets.
21For a complete list, see https:
cps.ipums.org/cps/codes/occ_20032010_codes.shtml
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empted from all FLSA coverages or only the overtime provision. Examples include farmers employed
on small farms, railroad and air carrier employees. Second, we label occupations that would most
likely pass the “Duties Test" based on the Department of Labor’s duty description. These oc-
cupations consists of four major categories: “Executive Employees", “Administrative Employees",
“Professional Employees" and “Computer Employees". We leave out “Outside Sales Employees"
because it’s hard to decide if workers in sales-related occupations satisfy the duties description,
and there wasn’t a salary level requirement before or after the rule change, therefore it’s hard to
tell if they are directly affected by the rule change. In Appendix A, we list the occupation codes
under each categories. Then we classify workers by their income level. We definite the group of
workers as “Between Group" if their salary falls into the old and new salary benchmark interval. For
simplicity, we use the “short test" benchmark ($250 per week) in the old rule. It is consistent with
the impact studies issued by the Department of Labor. Moreover, by choosing the relatively higher
benchmark (the “long test" has a benchmark $155 per week), we identify the group of workers with
higher probability to gain eligibility of overtime pay, since workers with weekly salary between $155
and $250 could be eligible for overtime pay before the rule change using the “long test". In our
robustness check, we shift the salary benchmark to different levels and the results are very similar.
We also exclude those who earn more than $100000 in annual income, since they are not covered
by FLSA overtime provision and usually top-coded in the data. In the SIPP panel, information on
income and hours is at monthly level, we use average weekly income to label income group. CPS
outgoing rotation group data, however, has information on hours worked in the week prior to the
interview. Our empirical analysis is at monthly level for SIPP, and is at weekly level for CPS.
We divide jobs in our sample into two categories based on labor income: salary or hourly wage.
These two categories are then further divided based on their overtime exemption status. Wage
jobs in general are eligible for overtime pay, except for a few occupations not covered by FLSA
overtime rule. We label these jobs as “Exempt" under the wage job category, and label the rest as
"Non-Exempt"22. For SIPP, we have less than 1% out of all the wage job observations that are
exempted based on this. The categorization for salary jobs is a bit more detailed. To be exempt from
22For example: clergy, railroad conductors, captains and other officers on fishing vessels, see Appendix A
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overtime pay, salary workers have to pass both the “Salary Level Test" and the “Duties Test". We
focus on three subgroups within salary groups. “Treated" group refers to jobs that would pass the
“Duties Test" whose income falls in the “Between Group". “Exempt" group refers to jobs that had
salary above the $455 new benchmark and pass the “Duties Test". These are mainly high income
administrative, executive or professional jobs. The “Exempt" group in the sample mainly serves as
comparison to the “Treated’ group since their job duties are similar. We also pick “Non-Exempt"
group that has similar income level as a reference group. For this group, the income level also falls
in the “Between Group", but workers’ occupations most likely wouldn’t pass the “Duties Test" and
therefore they would not be eligible for overtime pay after the rule change. “Low Income" group
refers to the group of workers whose income was below the original salary test threshold $250 per
week. We use only the income criteria to select “Low Income" group in order to have reasonable
number of job spells. In our robustness check, we narrow the definition by restricting to job spells
that pass the “Duties Test". Such a group classification allows us to identify the effects of mandatory
overtime pay for various groups and test the predictions from our adverse selection model.
2.4.3 The Effect of Overtime Rule Change on Hours and Income
We use the following model to study the direct impact of rule change on hours and income:
Yit = α0Treatedi ∗RuleChanget + α1Exempti ∗RuleChanget
+ α2LowIncomei ∗RuleChanget +Xitβ + δt + ξi + εit
Treatedi is the group dummy for workers that gained overtime eligibility under the new rule.
Exempti and LowIncomei are defined similarly. RuleChanget is a time dummy for observations
after the rule change23. We include job and time fixed effects in our model. Xit includes worker level
control variables: age, education, martial and union status. The coefficients α0, α1 and α2 are the
effects of rule change on “Treated", “Exempt" and “LowIncome" groups identified by diff-in-diff: the
23The rule change was effective starting August 23rd, 2004, we set September 2004 and afterwards as post
rule change period.
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difference between the change of each group before and after the rule change. We use this model to
study the impact of rule change on working hours, overtime working and wage. Since salary jobs are
directly affected by overtime rules and quite different from wage jobs in many aspects, we exclude
wage jobs from the sample when estimating the model.
Table 2.3 shows the baseline results from SIPP panel. For the “Treated" group, the rule is
estimated to increase working hours for about 2%, and increase wage rate and monthly income for
about 15%. The increase in working hours, wage rate and total income for the “Treated" group is
consistent with our adverse selection model for overtime labor: mandatory overtime pay provides a
“price floor" in an otherwise monopolistic labor market for the firm, as a result, workers with higher
preference for leisure will be sufficiently compensated to supply overtime work, resulting in increases
in overtime working, higher wage rate and total labor income. The coefficients on “Exempt" and
“LowIncome" also lends support to our multi-segment model for overtime working. There is a signif-
icant decline in overtime working for the “Exempt" group after the rule change, while the coefficient
sign for hourly wage rate and total labor income is positive. This corresponds to Case 2 in the
multi-segment model, where firms prioritize “high" type tasks to group H worker but exclude the
high leisure group γhH : overtime work for group H decreases, but the average wage rate increases,
since the proportion of highly compensated task θ¯ among overall overtime work has increased.
We also estimate the same model using CPS panel. Table 2.4 shows a larger effect on income:
hourly rate and weekly income increased for about 36%, but does not show any meaningful impact
on the hours worked. Similar to SIPP panel, the effect on “Exempt" group is quite insignificant. We
use different sample scopes of CPS in estimation and the results are quite robust. We also include
“Non-Exempt" group in one of our model specifications and find a 23% increase in income after the
rule change, less than the “Treated" group but more than the “Exempt" group.
To further examine if the results are driven by a general time trend or a sudden change in a
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particular year, we estimate the Diff-in-Diff coefficients by year:
Yit = α0Treatedi ∗RuleChanget ∗ Y earDummyt + α1Exempti ∗RuleChanget ∗ Y earDummyt
+Xitβ + δt + ξi + εit
A similar model is estimated for CPS, but using monthly dummy instead. Table 2.5 shows that
the rule change impact were relatively stable across years. For example, hourly wage rate increase
is estimated at about 15% from 2005 to 2007 each year, except for 2004, which showed a lower
magnitude at about 8%. But it should also be noted that the rule change was officially enacted on
late April 2004.
To compare the group difference before and after rule change, we plot residuals from baseline
regression Yit = Xitβ+ δt + ξi + εit and estimated monthly Diff-in-Diff time effects over time.Figure
2.1 and 2.2 shows the graphs for weekly hour and income. For each variable of interest, we plot
three graphs:
1. the residual from baseline regression, plotted over time. To simplify the visual, we plot different
percentiles of residual distribution and trace the distribution change over time by mapping fitted
time series graph over time.
2-3. Diff-in-Diff estimates of “Treated" group against baseline control group. We plot the “Treated"
group time effect together with time effects for “Exempt" and “Non-Exempt" group, in the second
and third graph respectively for each key variable.
The graphs from SIPP results illustrate the identification of rule change effect: for “Treated"
group, we see a notable increase in income and wage after the rule change and the magnitude of
increase remain relatively stable. In comparison, “Exempt" and “Non-Exempt" groups remain rel-
atively flat. This shows that our estimation results are not driven by a general time trend in the
group difference.
Similarly, Figure 2.3 plots the group difference over the rule change period for estimates from CPS
panel. The results are a bit different from those in the SIPP panel: consist with estimation results
for working hours, there isn’t much significant difference between groups overtime, the estimated
effects of rule change on wage and income seem to be a general group difference, since even before
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the rule change we also observe a relative increase in income for treated group that is of similar
magnitude.
Overall, we find some evidence that the 2004 FLSA rule change increased the wage and income
for salaried workers who were directly impacted by the increase in salary level test threshold, but
the results are a bit mixed across different datasets.
2.4.4 Income and Wage models
Under FLSA, workers who are not exempted from overtime pay would receive “time-and-half" pay
if their work exceeds 40 hours per week. To study the real effect of the rule change on overtime
pay premium, we need to compare the relative rate of overtime hours against regular hourly rate
before and after the rule change. In the data, we rarely have good measure of the overtime pay
workers receive for a given period of time. In addition, it’s not unusual for workers to get some
extra labor income in the form of performance pay, such as commission or bonus. To circle around
this problem, we use the following model to derive overtime pay premium:
Let It be the total labor income for a worker in time period t, and St be the salary. Given that a
worker works for ht hours in the period, his effective average wage rate is wt = It/ht. Let S be the
worker’s base salary, his normal hourly rate is S/h¯ where h¯ is the threshold for overtime work (40
hours per week). The total labor income is then modeled as the following:




Taking logarithm of both sides, we decompose labor income into salary part and overtime pay:
log Iit = logS + log(1 + β
hit − h¯
h¯
) ≈ logS + βhit − h¯
h¯
based on the equation above, we derive the following empirical models:
log Iit = β0
hit − h¯
h¯
∗RuleChanget + β1hit − h¯
h¯
+Xitγ + δt + ξi + εit
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or, equivalently,
logwit = −α log(hit) + β0hit − h¯
h¯
∗RuleChanget + β1hit − h¯
h¯
+Xitγ + δt + ξi + εit
With job and time fixed effects, we are able to get round the baseline salary for the job since usually
we only observe the total labor income that includes overtime pay. The coefficients for variables
containing hit−h¯
h¯
measure the relative rate at which overtime hours are compensated for. β0 is then
the identified effect of rule change on overtime pay rate.
We estimate a pooled-sample model in which we include all the salary job samples in the model
and use group dummies to differentiate the impact on workers with different exemption status:
log Iit = β0GroupDummyi ∗RuleChanget ∗ hit − h¯
h¯
+ α1GroupDummyi ∗ hit − h¯
h¯





+Xitγ + δt + ξi + εit
As Table 2.6 and 2.7 shows, the average effect of rule change on overtime pay premium is
about 0.27 for the “Treated" group. This means that overtime rates increased by about 27% over
the normal rate after the rule change. The estimated effect has a quite large standard error (0.24)
and is not significant. If the rule change had the intended outcome for workers who gained overtime
eligibility, we should expect to see a significant estimated effect on the “Treated" group around 0.5.
There are a few possible explanations for this. First, as Trejo (1991) pointed out in the “Fixed-Job
Model", employers could lower the normal wage rate in response to the rule, this would lower the
overtime pay premium estimated from data. Moreover, as anecdotal evidence suggests, overtime pay
is not always used exactly as required by the law. This means employers could withhold overtime
pay even when the employee is eligible for it. Another interesting finding is that there was a small
but significant increase in overtime pay premium for “Exempt" group. The estimated coefficient
0.076 means that after the rule change the overtime rate has increase by about 7% over the normal
rate. There isn’t any direct mechanism from the rule change to increase the overtime premium for
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exempted workers. One possible explanation is the externality from the “Treated" group, as some
workers in the same firm are getting extra compensation, it’s hard to leave out other employees,
and updating the payroll system could be costly. It could also be a spill-over effect due to reduced
labor supply, as our adverse selection model on multi-segments of workers suggests, “Exempt" group
workers with higher preference for leisure could be priced out of the market, leaving only the high
paying overtime job for them and hence increase the average overtime pay premium.
Another interesting finding is the group difference in overtime pay premium. The coefficients
for Treatedi∗ hit−h¯h¯ and Exempti∗ hit−h¯h¯ are -0.55 and -0.04 respectively. This means before the rule
change, the average overtime premium is significantly lower for these two groups compared with
the rest of the salary jobs. The magnitude of difference is much larger for the “Treated" group, it
implies a 55% less overtime premium than other salary jobs. This is consistent with “time-and-half"
overtime pay, since “Treated" group workers were not exempted from overtime pay before the rule
change.
A counter-intuitive result is the estimated magnitude of overtime pay rate. As in our baseline
model, β is the relative rate of overtime pay with respect to regular hourly rate. If salary workers
get compensated for extra hours, the rate should be at least close to the regular hours. In the
income and overtime pay premium model (Table 2.7), for salary jobs in our sample, we get very
small estimates of β for both exempt and non-exempt workers, 0.011and 0.002 respectively, and the
estimates for “Treated" group is as low as as -0.516 (this however, is consistent with the “time-and-
half" difference as pointed out earlier). There are two possible explanations for this. First, there
might be a prevalent non-compliance of the FLSA even though the "Non-Exempt" jobs are statu-
torily qualified for overtime pay. Second, the wage and income models do not account for non-hour
related variable labor compensation such as bonus: if workers could get the task done within regu-
lar hours and get rewarded for high quality work, we will then observe a very low rate of overtime
compensation because the non-hour-related performance pay drives up baseline salary in our model.
Overall, we find an increase in overtime pay premium after the rule change for workers who
gained overtime eligibility under the new rule. There was on average a 26% increase with respect to
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normal rate. However, the effect varies across jobs in the group and is not significant. Meanwhile,
there is a small but significant increase in overtime premium for “Exempt" group. Their overtime
premium rate increased by about 8% after the rule change. This might be due to the externality
from the directly impacted group on labor market supply, as predicted in our adverse selection
model.
2.4.5 Robustness of Results
To test if our results are sensitive to the group identification methods, we change the criteria and
re-estimate the models to see if the estimates are robust to slight change of definition.
We first test if the results are sensitive to the time frame of our income group definition. One
drawback of the income group identification is that it “forces" the income level to be between the
old and new salary benchmark. As we examine the income and wage rate after the rule change, it’s
possible to see an increase in them just because of this selection issue: income will increase for that
group because the group selection are only based on income level before the rule change. To address
this concern, we use a placebo test to estimate the effect. We choose June 2004 as the “placebo"
rule timing - 3 month prior to the actual rule change. Similar to the previous analysis, we plot the
month-by-month estimates to show the trend. Figure 2.4 plots the time trend of the coefficients
from the placebo test, for the effects on hours and income as well as the wage model. The first
graph shows the Diff-in-Diff estimates for overtime wage premium. There is a sizable increase in
coefficients after the actual rule change, this suggests that the overtime premium only starts to
increase for the “Treated" group against the rest of salary jobs when the new rule is implemented.
The second and third graph plots the estimated trend for wage and weekly working hours. The
wage increase is stabilized after the actual rule change, there is an increasing trend that started
2 months prior to the actual rule change, but compared with the original estimates in Figure 2.2,
the trend and timing of the increase are still very similar. The trend of weekly working hours is
also similar to the original estimates. The placebo test reaffirms that our results are robust to the
timing of income group selection criteria.
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A second concern is the choice of income benchmark. The old rule has a “Long Test" which
requires only a weekly income of $155. In addition, since our weekly income is imputed using total
income and number of weeks worked in the month, we might overestimate workers’ salary basis since
they could receive performance based pay in the form of tips, commission or bonus. Therefore, we
relax the income benchmark to see if our results are driven by a sub-group of workers. Table 2.8
shows the wage and overtime pay premium model estimation. The results are quite similar to our
previous findings: the overtime pay premium increased by about 22.1%for the “Treated" group and
is significant at 10% level. We also get similar coefficients for the “Exempt" group. Table 2.9 shows
the estimated effects on hours and income. Weekly hours increased by 1.9% and wage increased by
6.6%. The estimates are slightly lower than our original estimates because the baseline selection
criteria is more restrictive. By relaxing the income selection range, we are more likely to include
jobs that were not directly affected by the rule change.
2.5 Conclusion
We study the effect of the revision to statutory overtime pay under Fair Labor Standard Acts in
2004 and find evidence that workers’ hours and income increased for those who gained statutory
overtime pay coverage. We also find spill-over effects on the overtime pay premium and overtime
schedule on workers who are not directly affected by the rule change. Our results suggest that
overtime pay regulation does have tangible effects on the labor market. Contrary to the belief that
firms can simply adjust the wage rate in response to the mandatory overtime pay premium such
that the working schedule and compensation remain de-facto unaffected, our results suggest that
workers benefit from increased overtime pay. The result is consistent with our adverse selection
model and suggests that overtime pay regulation has effects on the contractual and informational
aspects of the supply and demand for overtime work. Further research on the contract aspect for
overtime pay and the mechanism through which it affects both the supply and demand of labor
would be interesting.
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Without FLSA With FLSA FLSA effect
Firm demand and worker supply OT pay High type Low type OT pay High type Low type Hours Efficiency
γL < θ < γH γL N Y γL < ωFLSA < θ N Y Same Same
γL < θ < ωFLSA N N Decrease Decrease
γL < γH < θ γH Y Y γH < θ < ωFLSA N N Decrease Decrease
(pγθ > γH − (1− pγ)γL) γH < ωFLSA < θ Y Y Same Same
γL < ωFLSA < γH Y Y Same Same
γL < γH < θ γL N Y γH < θ < ωFLSA N N Decrease Decrease
(pγθ < γH − (1− pγ)γL) γ¯(∗) < ωFLSA < θ Y Y Increase Increase
γL < ωFLSA < γ¯
(∗) N Y Same Same
*The cutoff γ¯ = γH−pγθ1−pγ . When mandatory overtime pay ωFLSA is above this level, firms will find it more profitable to raise the pay to
max(γH , ωFLSA) to induce all workers working overtime.
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Overtime Probability
Initial Target Offer Firm’s expected profit H M
H γhH θHH − γhH 1 0
H (γlH , γ
h
M) (1− pH)(θHH − γlH) + pH(θHM − γhM) (1− pH) pH
H (γlH , γ
l
M) (1− pH)(θHH − γlH) + pH(1− pM)(θHM − γlM) (1− pH) pH(1− pM)
M γhM θHM − γhM 0 1
M (γlM , γ
h
H) (1− pM)(θHM − γlM) + pM(θHH − γhH) pM (1− pM)
M (γlM , γ
l
H) (1− pM)(θHM − γlM) + pM(1− pH)(θHH − γlH) pM(1− pH) (1− pM)
Table 2.1: Task θH delegation and corresponding payoffs
Initial Overtime Probability
Target Offer Firm’s expected profit H M
H γhH θHH − γhH 1 0
H (γlH , γ
h
M) (1− pH)(θHH − γlH) + pH(θHM − γhM) (1− pH) pH
H (γlH , ωFLSA) (1− pH)(θHH − γlH) + pH(1− pM)(θHM − ωFLSA) (1− pH) pH(1− pM)
M γhM θHM − γhM 0 1
M (ωFLSA, γ
h
H) (1− pM)(θHM − ωFLSA) + pM(θHH − γhH) pM (1− pM)
M (ωFLSA, γ
l
H) (1− pM)(θHM − ωFLSA) + pM(1− pH)(θHH − γlH) pM(1− pH) (1− pM)
Table 2.2: Task θH delegation and corresponding payoffs with FLSA Overtime rule change
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Dependent Variable log hours log hours Overtime log income log wage wage
(monthly) (weekly) Dummy (monthly) (hourly) (hourly)
Treated*Rule 0.025* 0.025* 0.013 0.162*** 0.138*** 1.940***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.69)
Exempt*Rule -0.002 -0.002 -0.016** 0.003 0.005 1.387***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.26)
LowIncome*Rule 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.048 0.041 0.361
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.49)
Age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010* 0.018*** 0.011* -0.196
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.25)
Age2/100 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.013** -0.022*** -0.013* 0.314
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.28)
Edu -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 0.007 0.008 0.341
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.31)
Union 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.033 0.027 0.705
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.56)
Married 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09)
R2 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.025 0.026 0.008
N 358077 358077 358077 355842 355842 355842
Table 2.3: Effect of rule change on hours and income
1. Model: Yit = α0Treatedi∗Rulet+α1Exempti∗Rulet+α2LowIncomei∗Rulet+Xitβ+δt+ξi+εit
2. RuleChange is time dummy for enactment of 2004-FLSA regulations change. (2004 September)
3. 2004 SIPP Panel, from year 2003 (starting July) to 2007
4. Samples exclude those who work for different jobs at the same time, or self employed
5. “Treated" group refers to job spells that are exempted before 2004 rule change and not exempted
after
6. Standard Errors clustered at job spell level
7. Year-Month and state fixed effect included
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Dependent Variable log hours Overtime log income log wage Extra Get
(weekly) Dummy (weekly) (hourly) payment overtime
Only samples work on same job
Treated*rule 0.010 0.002 0.366*** 0.362*** -0.009 0.001
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Exempt*rule 0.003 0.015 -0.000 -0.010 -0.026*** -0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
r2 0.004 0.002 0.017 0.022 0.038 0.006
N 16722 16726 16673 15666 16726 16726
Only samples work on same job
Treated*rule 0.012 0.004 0.389*** 0.384*** -0.008 0.001
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Exempt*rule 0.005 0.017 0.022* 0.012 -0.025*** -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Non-Exempt*rule 0.012 0.011 0.198*** 0.193*** 0.009 0.004
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00)
r2 0.004 0.002 0.023 0.029 0.038 0.006
N 16722 16726 16673 15666 16726 16726
All samples include those who switch jobs
Treated*rule 0.015 0.008 0.438*** 0.425*** -0.005 -0.000
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00)
Exempt*rule 0.008*** 0.014** 0.037*** 0.027*** -0.021*** -0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Non-Exempt*rule 0.007 0.026** 0.232*** 0.239*** 0.008 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
r2 0.003 0.003 0.022 0.028 0.041 0.009
N 37372 37382 37248 35252 37382 37382
Wage jobs
Rule 0.009 0.000 0.051** 0.024 -0.036** 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
r2 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.002
N 20785 20794 20772 20671 20794 20794
Table 2.4: Effect of rule change on hours and income (CPS)
1. Model: Yit = α0Treatedi ∗RuleChanget + α1Exempti ∗RuleChanget +Xitβ + δt + ξi + εit
2. RuleChange is time dummy for enactment of 2004-FLSA regulations change. (2004 September)
3. CPS Panel
4. Samples exclude those who work for different jobs at the same time, or self employed
5. "Treated" group refers to jobs spells that are exempted before 2004 rule and not exempted after
6. Standard Errors clustered at job spell level
7. Year-Month fixed effect included
8. Extra payment is the dummy for if worker usually gets overtime/tips/commission.
9. Get overtime is the dummy for to if worker work overtime and paid extra
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Dependent Variable log hours log hours Overtime log income log wage wage
(monthly) (weekly) Dummy (monthly) (hourly) (hourly)
Treated*Rule*2004 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.086*** 0.084** 1.467***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.57)
Treated*Rule*2005 0.029** 0.029** 0.013 0.170*** 0.143*** 1.980***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.67)
Treated*Rule*2006 0.027** 0.027** 0.024 0.187*** 0.161*** 2.022**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.87)
Treated*Rule*2007 0.047* 0.047* -0.004 0.217*** 0.172** 2.559
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (1.66)
Exempt*Rule*2004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.021*** 0.002 0.005 0.895***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.27)
Exempt*Rule*2005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.016** 0.001 0.003 1.304***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.29)
Exempt*Rule*2006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 0.005 0.007 1.934***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.38)
Exempt*Rule*2007 0.002 0.002 -0.017 -0.004 -0.006 1.533***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.56)
Age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010* 0.018*** 0.010 -0.205
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.25)
Age2/100 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.013** -0.022*** -0.013* 0.324
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.28)
Edu -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 0.008 0.008 0.346
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.31)
Union 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.033 0.027 0.701
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.56)
Married 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09)
r2 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.025 0.026 0.008
N 358077 358077 358077 355842 355842 355842
Table 2.5: Effect of rule change on hours and income (by year)
1. Model: Yit = α0Treatedi ∗ RuleChanget ∗ Y earDummyt + α1Exempti ∗ RuleChanget ∗
Y earDummyt +Xitβ + δt + ξi + εit
2. RuleChange is time dummy for enactment of 2004-FLSA regulations change. (2004 September)
3. 2004 SIPP Panel, from year 2003 (starting July) to 2007
4. Samples exclude those who work for different jobs at the same time, or self employed
5. “Treated" group refers to jobs spells that are exempted before 2004 rule and not exempted after
6. Standard Errors clustered at job spell level
7. Year-Month and state fixed effect included
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Dependent Variable log wage (hourly)
Salary Jobs Wage Jobs

































0.047*** 0.268 0.106 0.148 0.078*** -0.001 0.110
(0.01) (0.24) (0.08) (0.33) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20)
hit−h¯
h¯
-0.085*** -0.121*** -0.563** -0.229** -0.375 -0.100*** -0.103*** -0.398
(0.02) (0.02) (0.25) (0.10) (0.26) (0.03) (0.02) (0.26)
log(hit) -0.824*** -0.823*** -0.944*** -0.698*** -0.863*** -0.864*** -0.047*** -0.096
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) (0.07)
R2 0.191 0.190 0.372 0.159 0.365 0.245 0.036 0.084
N 355842 355842 3730 11232 4600 123338 575263 3654
Table 2.6: Wage and overtime premium Model
1. Model: logwit = −α log(hit) + β0 hit−h¯h¯ ∗RuleChanget + β1 hit−h¯h¯ +Xitγ + δt + ξi + εit
2. RuleChange is time dummy for enactment of 2004-FLSA regulations change. (2004 September)
3. “Treated" group refers to jobs spells that are exempted before 2004 rule and not exempted after
4. “LowIncome" group refers to job spells that have lower income level than “Treated" group prior to rule change
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Dependent Variable log wage (hourly)
Salary Jobs Wage Jobs

































0.049*** 0.266 0.111 0.148 0.079*** 0.047** -0.081
(0.01) (0.24) (0.09) (0.34) (0.02) (0.02) (0.23)
hit−h¯
h¯
0.058*** 0.022 -0.516** 0.002 -0.254 0.011 0.332*** 0.231
(0.01) (0.01) (0.25) (0.07) (0.27) (0.02) (0.02) (0.21)
R2 0.026 0.025 0.187 0.043 0.084 0.044 0.028 0.061
N 355842 355842 3730 11232 4600 123338 575263 3654
Table 2.7: Income and overtime premium Model
1. Model: log Iit = β0 hit−h¯h¯ ∗RuleChanget + β1 hit−h¯h¯ +Xitγ + δt + ξi + εit
2. RuleChange is time dummy for enactment of 2004-FLSA regulations change. (2004 September)
3. “Treated" group refers to jobs spells that are exempted before 2004 rule and not exempted after
4. “LowIncome" group refers to job spells that have lower income level than “Treated" group prior to rule change
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Dependent Variable log wage (hourly)
Salary Jobs Wage Jobs























0.047*** 0.216* 0.117* 0.078*** -0.001 0.110
(0.01) (0.12) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20)
hit−h¯
h¯
-0.090*** -0.121*** -0.292* -0.118* -0.097*** -0.103*** -0.398
(0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.26)
log(hit) -0.824*** -0.823*** -0.871*** -0.814*** -0.871*** -0.047*** -0.096
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.07)
r2 0.191 0.190 0.295 0.225 0.248 0.036 0.084
N 355842 355842 9017 26923 116166 575263 3654
Table 2.8: Wage and overtime premium Model (income group sensitivity)
1. Model: logwit = −α log(hit) + β0 hit−h¯h¯ ∗RuleChanget + β1 hit−h¯h¯ +Xitγ + δt + ξi + εit
2. RuleChange is time dummy for enactment of 2004-FLSA regulations change. (2004 September)
3. 2004 SIPP Panel, from year 2003 (starting July) to 2007
4. Samples exclude those who work for different jobs at the same time, or self employed
5. “Treated" group refers to jobs spells that are exempted before 2004 rule and not exempted after
6. Standard Errors clustered at job spell level
7. Year-Month and state fixed effect included
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Dependent Variable log hours log hours Overtime log income log wage wage
(monthly) (weekly) Dummy (monthly) (hourly) (hourly)
Treated*rule 0.019** 0.019** 0.023* 0.088*** 0.066*** 1.054***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.37)
Exempt*rule -0.001 -0.001 -0.016** 0.006 0.006 1.504***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.27)
Age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010* 0.018*** 0.010 -0.194
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.25)
Age2/100 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.013** -0.022*** -0.013* 0.311
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.28)
Edu -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 0.008 0.008 0.348
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.30)
Union 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.033 0.027 0.705
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.56)
Married 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.008
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09)
r2 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.024 0.025 0.008
N 358077 358077 358077 355842 355842 355842
Table 2.9: Effect of rule change on hours and income (income group sensitivity)
1. Model: Yit = α0Treatedi ∗RuleChanget + α1Exempti ∗RuleChanget +Xitβ + δt + ξi + εit
2. RuleChange is time dummy for enactment of 2004-FLSA regulations change. (2004 September)
3. 2004 SIPP Panel, from year 2003 (starting July) to 2007
4. Samples exclude those who work for different jobs at the same time, or self employed
5. “Treated" group refers to job spells that are exempted before 2004 rule change and not exempted
after
6. Standard Errors clustered at job spell level
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Figure 2.4: Rule change placebo test
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Chapter 3
Creditor Governance and Corporate Innovation
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3.1 Introduction
The recent Great Recession has again drawn the attention of economists and policy makers alike
to the role of financial intermediaries, in particular, banks in the aggregate economy, spurring a
wide range of works from macro study on financial stability and macro-economic policy to micro
analysis of firm-level credit provision, investment and employment growth. Banks not only provide
ex ante screening and credit to firms, but also conduct ex post monitoring to and renegotiations
with the borrowing firms. Recently a growing literature in corporate finance demonstrates that
banks have an effective monitoring role on firms well before and beyond the bankruptcy state and
documents a positive effect of this creditor governance. Their focus is on debt covenants, a non-
pricing loan contractual arrangement designed specifically to mitigate the creditor and shareholder
conflicts of interests. When the firm violates the covenant, it triggers an effective technical default
state and grants the bank legal rights to accelerate or terminate the loan and reduce unused loan
commitment. Banks usually renegotiate with the firms and obtain partial control rights with this
threat. The recent literature shows firms that violate debt covenants reduce internal and external
investment, cut costs and more likely to fire the CEO. It is also found, unsurprisingly, that firm
covenant violation is counter cyclical, with more firms violating covenants in economic recessions.
This paper empirically examines the effect of creditor governance, defined as increased creditor
(bank) monitoring and control rights in the state of debt covenant violation on corporate innovation.
Understanding the role of creditors on innovation is important because innovation, by affecting
productivity, is a fundamental driver of economic growth (Solow (1957)) and bank loans have been
long documented as the predominant source of external finance around the world, including the US
(Gorton and Winton (2003)). The goal of this study is to answer these questions by examining the
response of corporate financial policies to covenant violations.
Covenant violations provide a great setting in which economists could examine the interaction
of incentive conflicts between debt-holders and shareholders, the creditor governance and corporate
innovation for the following number of reasons. First, covenants are a special mechanism designed
in contract with the purpose of mitigating the incentive conflicts between managers and creditors,
documented in the classic paper by (Smith Jr and Warner (1979)). Second, creditors obtain the right
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to demand immediate repayment and withholding of further credit in the state of debt covenant
violation. This means the creditor has increased bargaining power and could monitor the firm’s
behavior. A recent burgeoning stream of papers document that the increased creditor right due to
covenant violation caused the firm to cut investment, lowered acquisition value, and decreased net
debt and stock issuance (Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012)). Also the CEO is more likely to be fired
due to covenant violation. Third, covenant violations occur frequently (Dichev and Skinner (2002))
and occurs well before the final stage of firm bankruptcy (Gopalakrishnan and Parkash (1995)),
thus making it an important and useful source of variation of firm’s financial situation. Lastly,
the particular nature of a covenant violation enables one to employ a quasi regression discontinuity
design that helps identify the causal effect of violations on corporate innovations.
Theoretically, an increased creditor right could likely have adverse impact on a firm’s corporate
innovation activities. Conducting innovative activities, unlike routine tasks such as production and
sales, requires willingness to take on risk and endure the possibility of failure. Unlike shareholders
who enjoy the up-side of the firm, creditors will have to do with the losses if the innovative projects
take up a large amount of firm-level resources and end up without commercial value. Managers may
also have a risk-shifting incentive to divert projects to risky and innovative activities. In this view,
since covenants are designed specifically to deal with the conflict of interest between shareholders
and creditors, it would not be surprising that an increased creditor right will make the firm to choose
less risky investment strategy and reduce the level of innovative output. On the other hand, the
existing literature on the role of creditor governance demonstrates that when the firm violates debt
covenants, the increased creditor rights has effective power in disciplining the manager. This view
acknowledges the more prominent issue is the agency problem between shareholders and managers
instead of the conflict of interests between shareholders and creditors. It therefore posits that the
increased monitoring of managers will induce more efficient usage of resources within the firm and
could likely increase the overall efficiency of innovative output. It is clearly that how the increased
creditor power due to covenant violation turns out to be an empirical question.
Our results show that when a firm violates its debt contract covenants, the firm will reduce
investment in capital expenditure and face difficulties in raising new capital either from debt market
or stock market, replicating existing literature. However, in terms of firm’s R&D spending, there
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is neither statistically significant nor quantitatively important change due to covenant violation.
For our main results on the number of two-year forward patents filed and finally granted as well
as the total citation count of these patents, we find there is a statistically significant decrease
in the number of patents. The economic magnitude of the effect is modest, at about 3% of the
average patents. When we turn to look at the overall citations of the patents, we find a statistically
significant 13% increase in the citations to these patents. When we look at the dynamic effects of
the covenant violation, we find the results to be quite persistent for up to 3 years after the initial
year of covenant violation. The effects gradually increase over the lag year for both the raw patent
count and citations count, finally reaching at 7% decrease for the patents and 30% increase for the
citations. Results from our robustness checks also confirm the validity of our main results. These
results are consistent with the view that an increased creditor power will not necessarily harm firm
innovation, but rather, it increases innovation efficiency by cutting managerial slack and induce
more efficient allocation of resources inside the firm.
The main contribution of this project will further our understanding on the importance of
bank monitoring. Our work joins a burgeoning works that focus on the real effect of debt holder
control rights in the setting of covenant violations (e.g., Chava and Roberts (2008); Roberts and Sufi
(2009); Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012)). These works in general find an active role played by creditors in
corporate governance, and uncover substantial improvement in firm performance associated with this
creditor control, for example, relieving investment distortion (Chava and Roberts (2008)), replacing
nonperforming managers, and improving subsequent operating and stock price performance (Nini,
Smith and Sufi (2012)).
Our paper also belongs to the literature that discusses the financial and institutional determi-
nants of innovation. An emerging empirical evidence shows that institutional aspects and players in
financial markets are all important determinants of corporate innovation, for example, stock liquid-
ity (Fang, Tian and Tice (2013)), investment cycles in financial markets (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf
(2013)), financial analysts (He and Tian (2013)), product market competition (Aghion et al. (2005)),
investors tolerance for failure (Tian and Wang (2014)), financial development in a local region
or country (Hsu, Tian and Xu (2014)), corporate governance and takeover regulation (Atanassov
(2013)), banking deregulation (Amore, Schneider and Žaldokas (2013),Chava et al. (2013)), banking
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competition (Cornaggia, Tian and Wolfe (2012)), and institutional ownership (Aghion, Van Reenen
and Zingales (2013)), private rather than public ownership (Ferreira, Manso and Silva (2012)) all
affect innovation. We contribute to this literature by showing that increased creditor power in the
state of covenant violation are also a first order determinant.
This paper is organized as the following. Section 2 introduces our main dataset and discusses a
novel pattern that is the file to grant year lag has been increasing over the years. Section 3 discusses
our empirical strategy and spells out our empirical specifications. Section 4 discusses our empirical
results including robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Main Dataset
The sample construction consists of all Compustat firm from 1996 to 2005, excluding fnancial
firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utility firms ( SIC codes 4900-4999). The beginning year of the
sample coincides with information provided by Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012) on covenant violations,
which only starts from 1996 because electronic filing first became available for all SEC-registered
firms. Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012) use a textual-search based analysis to identify the existence of
covenant violations from 10-K and 10-Q Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. Their
database is available for public usage on Amir Sufi’s website1. Interested readers could consult the
Data Appendix of Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012) for more details on the search algorithm and data
information. To construct the sample, I merge this covenant-violation dataset with Compustat firm
observations.
The firm-level data of patents and citations are provided by Kogan et al. (2012)2. This database
contains utility patents issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between
January 1, 1926 and November 2, 2010, along with citation data on those patents. Following
Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012), I use a set of variables called “covenant controls" to account for the
accounting ratios on which financial covenants are written and at the same time proxy for firm-




outcome of interest. These variables include: lagged book debt to assets ratio, lagged cash to assets
ratio, lagged EBITDA to assets ratio, lagged cashflow to assets ratio and current interest expense
to lagged assets ratio. Other controls include logarithm of book assets, tangibility, cash holding,
ROA, net capital expenditure, R&D spending and Tobin’s Q. All variables used in this study are
formally defined in Table 4. I require all these variables to be non-missing and thus end up with
58883 firm-year observations. To mitigate the impact of outliers on my analysis, I winsorize all
variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles, and my results remain quantitatively similar if I winsorize
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Table 5 lists the summary statistics for variables. The outcome variable, patent count for each
firm in each year, has an average of 11 and a median of 0, suggesting that the distribution of patent
created by firms are highly skewed. The mean and median of citation count for each firm and year
is 97 and 0, respectively. It is worth noting that the patent counts are quite similar but the patent
citation numbers are much larger than other papers that mainly rely on the NBER Patent Citation
Database in concurrent period. For example, He and Tian (2013) has an average patent count of
only 4 citations per patent on average, while that number more than doubles to 9 citations per
patent. This is because the Kogan et al. (2012) dataset use google patent database and are able to
recover more patents and their citations.
3.2.2 The increasing file-grant lag
An interesting by-product from this project is the finding that in the US, the number of years
between the year the patent is filed or applied and the year the patent is granted (the file-grant lag)
has been steadily increasing over the past 10 years, a finding not recorded in the existing literature
on innovation. To arrive at this finding, I dropped those patents whose grant year is earlier than
the file year as well as those patents whose grant year are missing. I also calculate the file-grant
lag as the difference of the grant year and the file year, with the caveat that some patents may be
filed at the end of a calendar year and granted in the beginning of a calendar year. In Table 1, I
present the proportion of patents finally granted by the year-bin (say, 1996 and 1997) of the filing
years with respect to the number of file-grant lag from 0 to 7 and more years. From 1996 to 1999,
the proportion of patents with 4 lag year is still not over 10% and the median lag year is 2. This
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pattern is consistent with the report by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) in which they tabulate
the filed and finally granted patents in years from 1967 to 1992 and find a somewhat consistent
pattern a median or mean lag year between 2 and 3 years. However, once we look beyond 1999, the
distribution of the file-grant lag changes substantially. The proportion of patents with lag-year of 4
years increased continuously from 11% in 2000-1 year-bin to 21% in 2004-5 year-bin. The median
lag-year also increases from 2 to 3 years. Finally in the year-bin of 2004-5, there is a substantial
fraction of patents, in fact 16%, are granted 5 years after the filing date. I also tabulate the lag-year
distribution for years after 2005, but since the dataset ends in 2010, many of the patents filed in
these years are still truncated, making further inference not feasible.
Table 2 tabulates the distribution of lag-years according to the patent grant years. This
different way of tabulation from Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) has the benefit of providing
information on the newest observations. We see that, for example, there is a non-negligible fraction
of patents granted in 2010 that were filed 5 or more than 5 years ago, the fraction being over 30%.
Rolling back to 1996-7 year bin, the number of patents that were filed 5 or more than 5 years account
for less than 4%. I also tabulate the mean and standard deviation of the lag-year of patents by
either the file year or the grant year in Table 3. Both the mean and standard deviation are almost
monotonically increasing over time, with the stronger case made by examining the grant-year.
Evidently, a detailed investigation of why there is such a changing distribution of the file-grant
lag in the patent warrants a project by itself and is beyond the scope of this paper. It is worth noting
the implications of this changing empirical distribution. The truncation problem for the NBER
patent database has been well documented in Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001). Usually papers
argue that the file-grant lag is only 2 or 3 years and therefore one approach is to simply drop the
last two or three years’ observations in the patent database used. The implication is that one should
drop the last 5 years’ observations, if one wants to use some recent patent databases. An alternative
to correct for the truncation bias in patent counts is to use the weight factors computed from the
application-grant empirical distribution, advocated by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001). This
methodology works when the empirical distribution of the file-grant lag is stable, and clearly with
recent data, the empirical distribution is changing and may make using this approach unsuitable.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 The Covenant Violation
The main empirical concern for an investigation of the effects of covenant violation is omitted
variable bias. That is, a firm violating covenant must not be performing well, compared with a firm
that does not, therefore the violating firm lacks the investment opportunities to do more innovation.
A naive strategy of comparing the innovative performance of firms violating covenants with those
that do not will not work. To disentangle the effects of the covenant violation from changes in
corporate innovation that would have otherwise occurred, I resort to the use quasi-discontinuity
regressions following Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012), which exploit the
discontinuity created at the point of violation. To be more precise, covenant violations depend
exclusively on whether a known variable is below or above a pre-specified threshold, regardless
of the distance to the threshold. This rule arbitrarily creates a discontinuous treatment in the
neighborhood of a known cut-off, and thus resembles a randomized trial. We apply this discontinuity
approach by including as right-hand side variables a covenant violation indicator variable along
with linear and nonlinear functions of the underlying variables on which covenants are written.
With this empirical specification, the point estimate on the covenant violation indicator variable
is identified under the assumption that corporate innovation decisions and performance are not
discontinuous exactly at the covenant threshold. As long as firm’s innovation performance (or
unobserved variables that affect innovation such as investment opportunities), as a function of
variables on which covenants are written, does not exhibit the same exact discontinuity at the
covenant threshold, we are able to identify the effect of covenant violation as a discrete change on
corporate innovation.
3.3.2 Empirical Specifications
Our right hand side variables used in our empirical specification are composed of financial and
accounting variables on which covenants are written. Following Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012), the
choice of these controls is based on the most common financial covenants employed in debt contract
agreements. These variables include: lagged book debt to assets ratio, lagged cash to assets ratio,
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lagged EBITDA to assets ratio, lagged cashflow to assets ratio and current interest expense to lagged
assets ratio. Other controls include logarithm of book assets, tangibility, cash holding, ROA, net
capital expenditure, R&D spending and Tobin’s Q, following the literature on corporate innovation,
such as Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2013). We use up to 4th order of these variables to
flexibly control for the nonlinear effects these variables could have on our outcome of interests.
A large sample of violating and non-violating firms are estimated in a dynamic model of
corporate innovation, with right-hand side variables including a covenant violation indicator variable
along with linear and nonlinear functions of the covenant controls mentioned above. By flexibly
controlling for these variables, the impact of a covenant violation is identified by the discontinuity
occurring at the covenant threshold. More specifically, we estimate the regressions as follows:
Yi,t+2 = α+ β1V iolationi,t +Xi,tβ2 +Zi,tβ3 +Zi,t−1β4 +HigherOrdersi,tβ4 + firmi + yeart + εi,t
where our outcome variable Yi,t+2 is either the patent count or the total citations count. Due
to the nature of innovation and patenting, we use the outcome variable at two years later. Violation
is an indicator variable that equals 1 for a financial covenant violation, X is a vector of innovation
control variables, Z is a vector of covenant control variables, we use the current and lagged covenant
control variables and HigherOrders is the up to 4th order series of the each of the covenant violation
controls. Lastly, we include firm fixed effects to control for any firm-invariant properties in innovation
and year fixed effects to account for aggregate time trends.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Results on corporate real and financial policies
Before discussing the main results of the covenant violation on firm innovation activities, we first
examine the impact on the firms’ real and financial activities in terms of capital expenditure and
R&D spending, net debt issuance and equity issuance.Existing literature has shown that following
covenant violation, firms sharply cut their capital expenditure and face great difficulty in obtaining
new loans as well as issuing new stocks (See Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012)). The main purpose of our
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empirical exercise is to demonstrate the validity of my empirical approach by replicating the existing
papers. At the same time, we also contribute a novel evidence to the literature by examining the
firm’s R&D spending.
Table 6 shows the effect of covenant violation on capital expenditure (investment), R&D spend-
ing, net debt issuance and stock issuance. In the odd columns, our specifications only include the
violation indicator and the firm and year fixed effects. We add the full controls in the even columns.
Our results show that there is a significant drop in the capital expenditure, with a point estimate
of -0.026 and is significant at 1% level. In terms of economic magnitude, compared with an average
investment rate of 0.36 it amounts to a 7.6% drop in investment. Similarly, we also find significant
drop in net debt issuance and stock issuance. When we examine the effect on R&D spending, we
find there is no effect due to covenant violation in terms of the amount of spending, with a point
estimate of almost identical to 0 and not significant at any reasonable level of confidence. This
finding demonstrates that even though firms reduce investment in capital, face difficulties in raising
new capital either through net debt issuance or new stock issuance, there is no change in firms’
spending on research and development. However, we think of this as some preliminary evidence on
corporate innovation as the accounting rules allows flexible discretion in allocating resources used
in actual R&D activities.
3.4.2 Main Results on Innovation
In this section, we examine the impact of covenant violation on innovation in terms of the number of
patents filed and finally granted and the total citation count of these patents 2 years forward. We use
the 2-year forward outcome variable because of the nature of technological innovation is slow-moving.
Our results are robust to examining either 1-year forward or 3-year forward outcome variables, with
similar quantitative results in these specifications. We present the results of our quasi- regression
discontinuity design in Table 7. When we regress the number of patent count on the covenant
violation dummy and firm and year fixed effects, we already see a statistically significant drop in
the number of patents. In the full specification where we fully control for the confounding effects
surrounding covenant violations, we find the point estimate to be -0.4 and significant at 1% level
of confidence. Given an average patent number of 11 this account for about 3% drop of the total
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patents. This modest decline in the number of patents suggest that an increased creditor power will
not have substantial adverse effects on corporate innovation. When we examine the total counts of
the number of citations, we find quite surprisingly, there is a positive and statistically significant
increase in the total number of citations, with the point estimate being 13.5 and significant at 1%
level of confidence. This means an economic magnitude of about 14% increases in total citations,
given an average citation number of 98. Results imply that the quality of patents has in fact
increased, which suggests a more efficient use of organizational resources to promote innovation,
despite the fact that the firm has cut spending in capital expenditure and faces difficulties in raising
capital from creditors or shareholders. Contrary to one view in the literature that creditors are
anti-innovation due to the riskiness of firm R&D and the potential risk shifting behavior by the
managers on behalf of shareholders, we actually find in the state of covenant violation, the firm has
not substantially reduced patent number but increased the quality of patents. Results imply that
increased creditor monitoring could indeed discipline managers to make the most efficient use of
resources to conduct innovative activities.
3.4.3 Dynamic Effects of Covenant Violation
In this section, we proceed to examine the dynamic effects of the covenant violation, trying to
investigate if such a causal effect we identified in the earlier subsection is persistent or short-lived.
To do so we add in our main specification the 1-year, 2-year and 3-year lagged covenant violation
indicator. For example, the 3-year lagged indicator identifies the effect covenant violation has on
the outcome of interest 3 years later, for the 2-year forward innovation outcome. If the effects are
short-lived, we would expect these lag-year effects to be decreasing in absolute magnitude. Results
for these empirical exercises are presented in Table 8. We find the effects of covenant violation for
the total patent number increased slightly from -0.42 (the immediate effect) to -0.64 (3-year after
covenant violation), although the coefficients are not statistically significant from each other. We
also examine the total citation counts, and we find a relative larger increase in the effects three
years after covenant violation. The magnitude doubled from 11 to 27 which could account for 30%
of the average total citations.
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3.4.4 Robustness
Finally we conduct a batch of robustness checks to confirm the validity of our main results. The
results are presented in Table 9. First, in column 1 we cluster the standard error at industry level
rather than at firm level as in the main regressions. The results are still significant at 5% level
with the same point estimate but an elevated standard errors. We also use bootstrap to generate
standard errors to account for the serial correlations in standard errors and as shown in column 2,
the results are still significant at 1% level of confidence. We use the 1-year forward patent count
and total citations count in column 3 and 4 and find the results are still statistically significant and
quantitatively similar to our main results. Since we are dealing with count data for both our patent
count and citation count, we use fixed effects poisson model and negative binomial model separately
in column 5 and 6 and results are again statistically significant at 1% level of confidence.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we exploit the institutional feature that in the state of debt contract covenant viola-
tion, creditors obtain increased control right of the firm to examine the effect of increased creditor
governance well before the state of bankruptcy on corporate innovation input and outcome. The-
oretical predictions are ambiguous, as the conflict of interests between creditors and shareholders
could justify an increased creditor right leading to lower innovative performance while at the same
time creditor monitoring could discipline managers and increase the efficiency of corporate inno-
vation. Consistent with the view that increased creditor monitoring has disciplining effect on the
managers, we find no significant change in the R&D spending, significant but model decrease in the
total patent counts two years forward as well as significant and large positive impact on the citation
counts of the patents. The results we identified are persistent up to three years after the initial
year of covenant violation. Our results demonstrate that increased creditor governance is overall
benefitial to firm innovation. Future works can be done to explore the specific mechanisms leading
up to the change in the internal organization and resource reallocation of the firm.
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Table 1: The changing distribution of file-grant lag in filing year 
This table describes the changing distribution of the lag between filing year and grant year using the 
Google Patent Database collected by Kogan et al. (2012) and available at  
https://iu.box.com/patents .  I dropped those patents whose grant year is earlier than the file year and 
whose grant year is missing. Each column tabulate the percentage of patents filed in that year and finally 
granted with respect to their file-grant year lag from 0 to 7 more years.  There is a clear pattern of 
increasing lag years between filing and grant. The lag years for recent filing patents are missing as the 
database ends in 2010.  
See Hall et al. for a tabulation of patents applied in years from 1967 to 1992 for comparison, where 
there is no such a pattern of increasing lag years. 
  Patent Filing Years   
 1996-7 1998-9 2000-1 2002-3 2004-5 2006-7 2008-9 2010 Total 
lag years Distribution of Lags in %   
0 0.53 0.59 0.63 0.69 0.4 0.79 2.11 100 0.65 
1 20.73 19.6 17.88 14.47 9.2 12.03 37.68 0 16.37 
2 47.8 41.09 34.56 28.57 24.37 28.61 60.21 0 34.82 
3 20.99 22.11 19.87 21.39 24.85 39.22 0 0 23.11 
4 5.98 9.03 11.11 15.61 20.81 19.34 0 0 13.05 
5 2.07 3.71 7.95 9.58 15.58 0 0 0 6.87 
6 0.97 1.74 4.22 5.59 4.79 0 0 0 3.11 
7+ 0.93 2.12 3.79 4.1 0 0 0 0 2.02 

















 Table 2: The changing distribution of file-grant lag in grant years. 
This table describes the changing distribution of the lag between filing year and grant year using the 
Google Patent Database collected by Kogan et al. (2012) and available at  
https://iu.box.com/patents . I dropped those patents whose grant year is earlier than the file year and 
whose grant year is missing. Each column tabulate the percentage of patents granted in that year with 
respect to the lag years from 0 to 7 more years. Again, there is a clear pattern that the file-grant lags 
have been increasing over the years. 
 
  Patent Grant Years 
 1996-7 1998-9 2000-1 2002-3 2004-5 2006-7 2008-9 2010 Total 
Lag (years) Distribution of Lags in % 
0 0.75 0.69 0.78 0.81 0.44 0.53 0.32 0.21 0.58 
1 30.12 23.08 21.7 20.6 13.08 9.26 7.18 4.38 16.21 
2 51.18 49.91 44.32 41.61 36.73 25.19 19.54 16.23 35.89 
3 14.16 19.96 23.67 23.12 25.49 27.07 25.76 24.14 23.26 
4 2.47 4.41 5.81 9.37 14.6 18.67 21.91 23.07 12.43 
5 0.75 1.02 1.83 2.61 6.6 11.33 13.54 15.78 6.46 
6 0.29 0.52 0.95 0.91 1.97 5.17 6.81 8.8 3 
        7+ 0.28 0.4 0.94 0.96 1.1 2.77 4.93 7.39 2.16 













































Table 3: Mean and Standard Deviation of the file-grant lag for each filing and grant year. 
This table describes the mean and standard deviation of the lag between filing year and grant 
year using the Google Patent Database collected by Kogan et al. (2012) and available at 
https://iu.box.com/patents .  I dropped those patents whose grant year is earlier than the file 
year and whose grant year is missing. The left panel is for the filing year and the right panel is 
for the grant year.  The increase in the file-grant lag is almost monotonic when organized in 
the grant year.  
File Year 
Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Grant 
Year 
Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
            
1996 2.246049 1.117476 144886 1996 1.854944 1.112238 109654 
1997 2.28861 1.166078 169582 1997 2.008338 0.954982 112020 
1998 2.429695 1.283346 168473 1998 2.092572 0.964524 147572 
1999 2.564102 1.475243 180673 1999 2.147105 1.044452 153591 
2000 2.801871 1.643921 196528 2000 2.236135 1.173776 157596 
2001 2.904018 1.692387 208665 2001 2.307521 1.251668 166158 
2002 2.994196 1.659626 205735 2002 2.300908 1.228359 167400 
2003 3.197978 1.614457 190536 2003 2.439945 1.251298 169078 
2004 3.288417 1.444881 179785 2004 2.581772 1.305458 164384 
2005 3.15235 1.264196 162593 2005 2.943673 1.385309 143891 
2006 2.842217 1.019163 132917 2006 3.184933 1.521158 173825 
2007 2.346354 0.746353 89244 2007 3.307895 1.549033 157336 
2008 1.714792 0.479713 41517 2008 3.479607 1.609778 157796 
2009 0.94098 0.235676 8675 2009 3.663876 1.657468 167468 
2010 0 0 397 2010 3.907035 1.732287 186243 
Total 2.758561 1.459228 2080206 Total 2.74756 1.501151 2334012 
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Table 4: Variable Definition 









The total number of non-self-citations received on the firm’s patents filed and 
eventually granted of company in two years ahead. 
    
Measures of Firm Variables  




Log of book value of total assets (Compustat data item ♯6) measured at the 




Research and development (R&D) expenditure (♯46) divided by book value of 




Return on assets ratio defined as operating income before depreciation (♯13) 
divided by book value of total assets (♯6), measured at the 
end of fiscal year t. 
    Investment_t  
Property, plant & equipment (♯8) divided by book value of total assets (♯6) 
measured at the end of fiscal year t 
       





Firm i's leverage ratio, defined as book value of debt (♯9+♯34) divided by 





 Capital expenditure (♯128) scaled by book value of total assets (♯6) measured 





Firm i's market-to-book ratio during fiscal year t, calculated as market value of 
equity (♯199♯25) plus book value of assets (♯6) minus book value of equity 
(♯60) minus balance sheet deferred taxes (♯74, set to zero if missing), divided 
by book value of assets (♯6) 
    
 
RDD Controls 




The lagged book debt to assets ratio, defined as the lagged value of book value 





The lagged cash to assets ratio, defined as the lagged value of cash (♯308) 





The lagged EBITDA (♯18) divided by the current value of book value of total 
assets (♯6). 




The lagged cashflow ((♯8+♯5) divided by the current value of book value of 




The current interest expense (♯15) to lagged value of book value of total assets 
(♯6). 
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 Table 5 Summary Statistics for All Variables Used in the Paper 
S.D. is sample standard deviation of the corresponding variable while p10(/50/90) is the 
10(/50/90)% percentile of the variable of interest.  The number of observations for each variable 
varies based on data availability. Definitions of all variables are in Table 4.  
 Obs. Mean S.D. p10 p50 p90 
Patent 51182 11.256 105.133 0.000 0.000 7.000 
Citation 51182 97.622 1181.285 0.000 0.000 48.000 
Asset 71360 4.726 2.434 1.781 4.658 7.871 
R&DAssets 71360 0.094 2.506 0.000 0.000 0.200 
ROA 71332 -0.026 0.224 -0.461 0.048 0.171 
PPEAssets 71347 0.279 0.237 0.039 0.205 0.658 
Leverage 71360 0.262 0.323 0.000 0.189 0.574 
Investment 70491 0.364 0.399 0.047 0.224 0.880 
TobinQ 71360 2.138 1.596 0.864 1.527 4.700 
Tangibility 71360 284.544 2651.574 -0.000 1.259 271.623 
bkDebtAssets 59602 0.628 27.541 0.000 0.167 0.579 
CashAssets 59602 -0.574 27.227 -0.143 0.000 0.025 
ebitdaAssets 59602 -0.432 20.600 -0.459 0.022 0.142 
CashFlowAssets 59602 -0.752 35.891 -0.453 0.057 0.152 

















Table 6: Effects of Covenant Violation on capital expenditure (investment), R&D spending, Net Debt 
Issuance and Stock Issuance.   
This table reports results from our Quasi Regression Discontinuity Design estimations for the effect of 
covenant violation on capital expenditure (investment), R&D spending, Net Debt Issuance and Stock 
Issuance.  Definitions of all other control variables are provided in Table 4. Robust standard errors 
clustered at firm-level are reported in parentheses. Our sample ranges from 1996 to 2005. Regressions in 
all columns include year-fixed effects and firm-fixed effects. We include the higher order controls for the 
covenant violations up to 4-th orders in the even columns. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








Violation -0.042*** -0.026*** 0.005** 0.000 -0.023*** -0.035*** -2.239*** -1.255*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.327) (0.371) 
         
Asset  0.092***  -0.052***  0.117***  14.654*** 
         
  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (2.083) 
         
PPEAssets  0.050**  0.309***  -0.091***  -21.990*** 
  (0.024)  (0.094)  (0.030)  (6.747) 
         
ROA  0.273***  -0.082***  -0.301***  -13.725*** 
  (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (4.416) 
         
Tangibility  -0.000  0.000***  -0.000  0.011 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007) 
         
TobinQ  0.047***  0.006**  0.014***  5.675*** 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.725) 
         
Higher Order 
Controls 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Year fixed 
effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Firm Fixed 
Effect  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70491 58883 71360 59569 67009 55791 70201 58580 
R2 0.042 0.092 0.000 0.249 0.007 0.027 0.003 0.028 
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Table 7: Effects of Covenant Violation on the number of patents and total citations. 
This table reports results from our Quasi Regression Discontinuity Design estimations for the effect of 
covenant violation on patent filed (and finally granted) as well as the total number of citations up to 2010 
for those patents.  Definitions of all other control variables are provided in Table 4. Robust standard 
errors clustered at firm-level are reported in parentheses. Our sample ranges from 1996 to 2005. 
Regressions in all columns include year-fixed effects and firm-fixed effects. We include the higher order 
controls for the covenant violations up to 4-th orders in the even columns. Coefficients marked with *, **, 
and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Patent Patent Citation Citation 
Violation -0.667*** -0.400*** 14.329*** 13.481*** 
 (0.155) (0.140) (3.597) (3.452) 
     
Asset  1.594***  -1.800 
  (0.596)  (11.301) 
     
R&DAssets  0.224  -0.817 
  (0.164)  (3.829) 
     
PPEAssets  2.118  66.976 
  (1.967)  (50.190) 
     
ROA  -2.230  112.731** 
  (1.795)  (47.234) 
     
Leverage  -2.003**  28.226 
  (0.823)  (17.267) 
     
Tangibility  0.000  -0.028 
  (0.000)  (0.018) 
     
TobinQ  1.069***  -5.373 
  (0.262)  (5.581) 
     
CapexAssets  2.503  100.218 
  (1.969)  (61.680) 
     
Higher Order Controls No Yes No Yes 
     
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 51182 41554 51182 41554 
R2 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.014 
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Table 8: Dynamic Effects of Covenant Violation on Patent number and citations. 
This table reports results from our Quasi Regression Discontinuity Design estimations for the dynamic 
effect of covenant violation (up to 3 years later) on patent filed (and finally granted) as well as the total 
number of citations up to 2010 for those patents.  Definitions of all other control variables are provided in 
Table 4. Robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are reported in parentheses. Our sample ranges 
from 1996 to 2005. Regressions in all columns include year-fixed effects and firm-fixed effects. We 
include the higher order controls for the covenant violations up to 4-th orders in the even columns. 
Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Patent Patent Citation Citation 
Violation -0.392** -0.426** 10.139*** 11.364*** 
 (0.156) (0.197) (3.488) (3.476) 
Violation_lag1 -0.498*** -0.407** 13.287*** 13.927*** 
 (0.154) (0.162) (4.353) (4.416) 
Violation_lag2 -0.725*** -0.569*** 12.784*** 13.240*** 
 (0.183) (0.185) (4.520) (4.825) 
Violation_lag3 -0.859*** -0.648** 26.805*** 27.154*** 
 (0.269) (0.273) (7.107) (7.463) 
     
Asset  2.414***  28.194* 
  (0.761)  (15.388) 
R&DAssets  1.128***  6.845 
  (0.345)  (7.948) 
PPEAssets  0.239  140.868 
  (3.151)  (87.723) 
ROA  -4.225*  48.919* 
  (2.262)  (27.728) 
Leverage  -1.738*  3.466 
  (0.912)  (23.008) 
Tangibility  0.000  -0.027 
  (0.000)  (0.018) 
Investment  -0.531  -12.042 
  (0.481)  (9.319) 
TobinQ  0.385  14.200*** 
  (0.271)  (5.233) 
CapexAssets  0.005  80.747 
  (4.251)  (56.706) 
     
Higher Order Controls No Yes No Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26693 26372 26693 26372 
R2 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.014 
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Table 9: Robustness Tests of Covenant Violation on Patent number and citations. 
This table reports robustness tests for our Quasi Regression Discontinuity Design estimations for the effect of 
covenant violation on patent filed (and finally granted) as well as the total number of citations up to 2010 for those 
patents.  The first column we cluster standard error at industry level and we use bootstrap to calculate the standard 
error in the 2nd column. We use the 1-year later patent and citations in column 3 and 4. We use fixed effects poisson 
model and negative binomial model in column 5 and 6. Definitions of all other control variables are provided in 
Table 4. Our sample ranges from 1996 to 2005. We include the higher order controls for the covenant violations up 
to 4-th orders in the even columns. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) 
 Patent Patent npat1 cite_num1 Patent Patent 
       
Violation -0.400** -0.400*** -0.503*** 8.863*** -0.145*** -0.100*** 
 (0.195) (0.123) (0.145) (2.387) (0.019) (0.034) 
       
Asset 1.594** 1.594*** 1.970*** 13.765 0.299*** 0.116*** 
 (0.730) (0.617) (0.557) (9.290) (0.005) (0.008) 
       
R&DAssets 0.224 0.224 0.283* 0.180 0.357*** 0.016 
 (0.144) (0.191) (0.146) (2.881) (0.026) (0.054) 
       
PPEAssets 2.118 2.118 2.486 80.273 0.634*** -0.303*** 
 (2.046) (2.293) (2.099) (52.547) (0.038) (0.098) 
       
ROA -2.230 -2.230 -4.454** 36.393 0.023 0.063 
 (2.692) (1.778) (2.126) (25.639) (0.024) (0.066) 
       
Leverage -2.003** -2.003** -1.638** 26.324 -0.465*** -0.245*** 
 (0.861) (0.835) (0.786) (17.275) (0.020) (0.054) 
       
Tangibility 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.030* -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
TobinQ 1.069*** 1.069*** 0.886*** 3.596 0.032*** 0.047*** 
 (0.315) (0.217) (0.219) (3.345) (0.002) (0.006) 
       
CapexAssets 2.503 2.503 0.478 33.101 1.359*** 0.600*** 
 (1.718) (2.512) (1.049) (23.160) (0.059) (0.200) 
       
Year fixed 
effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Firm Fixed 
Effect  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41554 41554 49616 49616 22437 22437 
R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.015   
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